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THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES
JOHN HARRISON*
Much that is said about the political question doctrine is wrong. The doctrine
as the Supreme Court has developed it is not a limit on the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is, however, a limit on judicial power in its
relations with political power. The doctrine has two branches. In one, courts
treat certain legal decisions by political actors as conclusive. The leading
example is recognition of states and governments, as to which the courts are
bound by non-judicial decisions. In the other branch, the mandatory remedies
that courts may give are limited in the extent to which they may direct political
actors with respect to highly sensitive discretionary decisions, mainly those
involving military and security matters. The doctrine’s rationale is that in some
unusual circumstances the law commits final decision of a legal question to a
non-judicial decision maker, as with Senate impeachment trials, and that the
distinction between judicial and political power implies some limits on the extent
to which the courts can command the exercise of the latter. A substantial number
of lower court decisions have seriously misunderstood the doctrine by treating it
as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction. In the name of the political question
doctrine, lower courts have refused to reach the merits of claims on grounds that
have no foundation in the Court’s cases or Article III.
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INTRODUCTION
To bring order out of chaos is the work of deity. To bring chaos out
of order requires some other hand. The Supreme Court’s cases
decided on the basis of the political question doctrine are orderly.
They reflect a coherent account of the difference between judicial and
political power, and the limits on judicial decision making that result
from that difference. Those cases do not treat the doctrine as a limit
on the federal courts’ jurisdiction. Commentators, lower federal
courts, and the Court itself in its dicta, have often lost sight of that
order. As a result, the lower courts, in the name of the political
question doctrine, have found limits on their own jurisdiction that are
not founded in the Court’s decisions or Article III of the Constitution.
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This Article’s title is in the plural because it describes what the
Supreme Court’s political question doctrine is, what it was, and what it
is not. It also discusses the political question doctrine of many lower
federal courts, explaining what it is but should not be, because it is
contrary to the Supreme Court’s cases and Article III.
Part I describes what the Supreme Court’s political question
doctrine is. The Court has relied on the doctrine in two contexts. Most
of its cases under that rubric assign to a non-judicial actor the final
authority to apply legal rules to particular facts. In the second context,
the doctrine limits the courts’ ability to give mandatory prospective
relief that would control political actors’ decisions concerning military
and national security matters. Contrary to commentators, lower
courts, and the Court’s dicta, the doctrine is not a limit on the
jurisdiction of Article III courts. It applies in three configurations,
none of which involves constitutional limits on subject matter
jurisdiction. Part I concludes by explaining the principles underlying
the Court’s decisions, and the derivation of those principles from the
separation of judicial and political power.
Part II describes what the political question doctrine once was,
explaining that the canonical political question case of Georgia v.
Stanton1 would today be understood as turning on standing. The Court
still takes the position that certain political rights may not be vindicated
by the federal courts, but now does so under the rubric of standing.
Part III deals with what the political question doctrine is in the lower
courts, but should not be because that is not what it is in the Supreme
Court or the Constitution. A substantial number of lower courts have
found that the political question doctrine deprives them of jurisdiction
under Article III to resolve cases involving liability, including the
personal monetary liability of federal officials, arising from the foreign
relations and national security operations of the United States. Those
decisions rest on a misunderstanding of the political question
doctrine, and in particular the Court’s discussion of it in Baker v. Carr,2
and are not justified under Article III.
I. WHAT THE DOCTRINE IS
This Part begins by describing the content of the Supreme Court’s
political question doctrine. It then shows that the Court’s cases that
rely on the doctrine do not treat it as a limit on the jurisdiction of the
1. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Article III courts. Part I concludes by explaining how the doctrine is
derived from the relationship between judicial and political power
under the Constitution.
A. The Substance of the Political Question Doctrine
The Court’s political question cases fall into two categories.3 In most
of the cases, some political actor’s decision applying law to fact is
accorded the finality that the courts’ judgments enjoy. The Court has
also found that the doctrine limits courts’ power to give prospective
remedies that control political discretion with respect to military matters.4
1. Non-judicial finality
“We have said that ‘In determining whether a question falls within
[the political question] category, the appropriateness under our
system of government of attributing finality to the action of the
political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination are dominant considerations.’”5 The Court has
attributed finality to political actors’ application of law to fact in three
circumstances: (1) when questions of sovereignty and relations among
sovereigns are at stake; (2) when the case involves the process of legal
enactment; and (3) when the Constitution explicitly designates a
house of Congress as judge, either of its own members’ elections or of
impeachments in the Senate.

3. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277, 306 (2004), a plurality of the Court found
that Equal Protection challenges to partisan gerrymandering present nonjusticiable
political questions because of the substance of judgments that the courts must make
when assessing such issues. An opinion of the Court to that effect would have resulted
in a third branch of the political question doctrine, which, like the other two, would
not be a limit on the courts’ jurisdiction.
4. For a brief discussion of the political question doctrine that identifies these
two branches, see John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of
Article III Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1367, 1372–75 (2007). Professor Tara Grove has
recently explored the political question doctrine as a principle of non-judicial finality.
Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908
(2015). Professor Grove maintains that in the nineteenth century the doctrine
functioned that way, but that the modern version differs substantially from the earlier
version. Id. at 1913–14. As I will explain, the Court’s decisions continue to treat the
political question doctrine as a source of non-judicial finality. Some dicta characterize
the doctrine as a limitation on the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts, but the
Court has in fact never held that it is. As I will also explain, so to hold would be
inconsistent with Article III.
5. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939)).
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a. Recognition of sovereignty and sovereign relations
Many of the Court’s political question cases treat a decision made by
the political branches concerning sovereignty, sovereign power, and
sovereign relations as conclusive.
The existence of states,
governments, and quasi-sovereigns, such as Indian tribes, and the
relations of war and peace among sovereigns, are questions the courts
will not decide for themselves when an authoritative political actor has
answered the question.6
At the head of this doctrinal line is Luther v. Borden,7 in which the
Court said that the judiciary should take as dispositive the political
branches’ resolution of a disputed question and decide the merits on
the basis of that resolution.8 Luther was a trespass action in the federal
diversity jurisdiction in which, as Chief Justice Taney dryly put it, the
questions before the Court were “not such as commonly arise in an
action of trespass.”9 Those uncommon questions concerned the
identity of the lawful government of Rhode Island.10
Luther arose out of the political disturbances in Rhode Island in 1841
and 1842, now known as the Dorr Rebellion.11 Dissatisfied with their
state’s constitutional system, which rested on its original colonial
Charter, a group of Rhode Islanders, led by Thomas Dorr, sought to
change Rhode Island’s Constitution through a direct act of popular
sovereignty.12 Without the legislature’s authorization, they convened
a constitutional convention, drafted a constitution, and submitted it to
a vote that they claimed was a referendum of the people.13 When that

6.
Recognition is a sovereign’s official acceptance of a status under international
law. A sovereign might recognize a foreign entity as a state, a regime as the
other state’s government, a place as part of the other state’s territory, rebel
forces in the other state as a belligerent power, and so on.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2118 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 2
MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1 (1963)); see also Baker, 369
U.S. at 215–17; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 35–37 (1849).
7. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
8. Id. at 47.
9. Id. at 35.
10. Id. at 35, 38–39.
11. Id. at 37.
12. Id. at 35, 37.
13. Id. at 36.
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referendum approved the new constitution, the insurgents formed a
government under it, electing Thomas Dorr as Governor.14
As far as the government under the Charter was concerned, these
proceedings were illegal and void, and the Dorr government’s
organization of a militia was an act of rebellion.15 When Governor King
of the Charter government sought aid from the federal government,
President Tyler responded that although he did not think that the
Dorrites’ conduct to that point had amounted to actual insurrection,
should an insurrection commence, he would authorize the use of
federal force under the statutes concerning civil disturbances in the
states.16 The Charter legislature proclaimed martial law and a militia
force, under Luther Borden, broke into the house of Martin Luther, a
Dorr supporter.17 Eventually, peace was restored, and a new
constitution with a broader franchise was drafted and approved by a
referendum arranged by the Charter legislature. That constitution
went into effect in 1843.18
Also in 1843, Luther, now a citizen of Massachusetts, sued Borden
for trespass in federal diversity jurisdiction.19 At trial, Borden justified
breaking into Luther’s house on the grounds that he had acted lawfully
as a member of the militia under martial law.20 Luther replied that the
Charter government was not lawful, having been replaced by the
people with the Dorr government, so it could not authorize Borden’s

14. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 91, 95
(1972); see also Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35–37.
15. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 36–37.
16. WIECEK, supra note 14, at 104; see also Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44.
17. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34. Compare Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 33–34
(providing that Borden claimed to be looking for Luther himself), with WIECEK, supra
note 14, at 113–14 (explaining that Borden and his fellow militia members were
looking for incriminating evidence).
18. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 37.
19. Id. at 1; WIECEK, supra note 14, at 114.
20. WIECEK, supra note 14, at 114–15.
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acts.21 The circuit court directed the jury that Borden’s plea of official
privilege was good and entered judgment for the defendant.22
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s disposition on the
merits.23 The Court did not, however, decide for itself whether the
Charter government had been the lawful government of Rhode Island.
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Court, concluded that the
identity of the lawful government of a state was a political question to
be decided by the political branches of the federal government, whose
decision would bind the courts.24 He maintained that under the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, “it rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a State. For as the United States
guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must
necessarily decide what government is established in the State before
it can determine whether it is republican or not.”25 From the
beginning, Congress had admitted Senators and Representatives
elected from Rhode Island under the Charter government. “And when
the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the
councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which
they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by
the proper constitutional authority.”26 Although “Congress was not
called upon to decide the controversy” because the Dorr government

21.
The plaintiff contends that the charter government was displaced, and ceased
to have any lawful power, after the organization, in May, 1842, of the
government which he supported, and although that government never was
able to exercise any authority in the State, nor to command obedience to its
laws or to its officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established
government, upon the ground that it was ratified by a large majority of the
male people of the State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a
majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then
existing laws of the State.
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38; see also WIECEK, supra note 14, at 115.
22. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38.
23. Id. at 38, 47 (upholding the defendant’s plea of justification and affirming the
decision of the Circuit Court on the merits of the case).
24. Id. at 47 (“[W]hether they have changed [the form of government] or not by
abolishing an old government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to
be settled by the political power. And when that power has decided, the courts are
bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.”).
25. Id. at 42.
26. Id.
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did not last long enough to elect Senators and Representatives, “the
right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.”27
By statute, Congress had authorized the President to call out the
militia to suppress insurrection.28 That too implied finality in a
political actor. “He is to act upon the application of the legislature or
of the executive, and consequently he must determine what body of
men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can
act.”29 President Tyler had stated that if necessary he would call out
the militia in support of Governor King and the Charter government.30
That determination bound the courts.31
When the President recognizes a foreign government or the
government of a state, he makes a legal judgment concerning specific
facts. Indeed, the Chief Justice noted that Congress could have required
the judiciary rather than the President to decide whether an insurrection
had occurred, and in the process to determine which organization was
the rightful government of a state.32 Congress had not done so, but
the possibility that the function could have been assigned to the
judiciary shows that it is one a court can in principle perform.
The Chief Justice agreed with the Dorr rebels that the people of a
state may change their government at their pleasure.
But whether they have changed it or not by abolishing an old
government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to
be settled by the political power. And when that power has decided,
the courts are bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.33

27. Id.
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 44.
31.
For certainly no court of the United States, with a knowledge of this decision,
would have been justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful
government; or in treating as wrongdoers or insurgents the officers of the
government which the President had recognized . . . . In the case of foreign
nations, the government acknowledged by the President is always recognized
in the courts of justice.
Id.
32. Id. at 43 (“They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have
placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency [of insurrection] had
happened which required the federal government to interfere. But Congress thought
otherwise, and no doubt wisely . . . .”).
33. Id. at 47.

2017]

THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES

465

Accepting the political branches’ answer to that question, the Court
then rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that martial law had been
improperly imposed and affirmed the decision below.34
Because of Luther, federal recognition of state governments has
become linked with the United States’ obligation under Article IV to
guarantee every state a republican form of government. Chief Justice
Taney said that when Congress admits the senators and representatives
of a state, the republican form of its government is conclusively
established.35 The connection was manifest in the dispute over the
Military Reconstruction Acts. In those statutes, Congress stated that no
legal state governments existed in ten ex-Confederate states, and that
military supervision was needed until “loyal and republican” state
governments could be established.36
Supporters of military
reconstruction maintained that under Luther, congressional
recognition of the new governments to be created under congressional
direction would be binding on the courts.37 The Supreme Court never
resolved the issue in the nineteenth century, but Luther did figure
centrally in an early twentieth century case concerning the Guarantee
Clause and direct democracy.
In Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,38 Oregon
imposed a tax on corporations, including the Pacific States Telephone
34. Id. at 45–47. Justice Woodbury agreed that the identity of the lawful
government was a political question, as to which courts were bound by the decisions
of political actors.
[W]e cannot rightfully settle those grave political questions which, in this case,
have been discussed in connection with the new constitution; and, as judges,
our duty is to take for a guide the decision made on them by the proper
political powers, and, whether right or wrong according to our private
opinions, enforce it till duly altered.
Id. at 56 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). Justice Woodbury differed from the majority on
the question of martial law, which he thought had been improperly invoked by the
Charter government. Id. at 63–64.
35. Id. at 42. In the public debate over the Dorr Rebellion, some supporters of
Dorr argued that the Charter government was unrepublican under Article IV. WIECEK,
supra note 14, at 90. Professor Grove maintains that the Court’s discussion of the
Guarantee Clause was a dictum, saying that the plaintiffs did not rely on that argument.
GROVE, supra note 4, at 1927–28. The question was relevant to the outcome: the Court
could have concluded that the Charter government was unlawful because it was
unrepublican. Had the parties raised the issue, the Court would have properly addressed it.
36. Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153,
14 Stat. 428 (1867).
37. See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 375, 414–18 (2001).
38. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
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Company, via the initiative process.39 In a collection action brought by
the state, the company argued that the tax was invalid because direct
democracy is unrepublican.40 Chief Justice White, speaking for the
Court, regarded the company’s argument as
based upon the single contention that the creation by a State of the
power to legislate by the initiative and referendum [process] causes
the prior lawful state government to be bereft of its lawful character
as the result of the provisions of § 4 of Art. IV of the Constitution.41

The Chief Justice concluded, however, that only the political branches
could determine that a state’s government had become unrepublican,
and that, until they did so, the courts could not “disregard the
existence in fact of the State [and] of its recognition by all of the
departments of the Federal Government.”42 He relied for that
proposition on “the leading and absolutely controlling case,” Luther.43
That case, he said, recognized the
necessity for the existence somewhere in the Constitution of a
tribunal, upon which the people of a State could rely, to protect
them from the wrongful continuance against their will of a
government not republican in form, proceeded to inquire whether
a tribunal existed and its character. In doing this it pointed out that
owing to the inherent political character of such a question its
decision was not by the Constitution vested in the judicial
department of the Government, but was on the contrary exclusively
committed to the legislative department by whose action on such
subject the judiciary were absolutely controlled.44

39. Id. at 134. Under the initiative process, “a stated number of voters were given
the right at any time to secure a submission to popular vote for approval of any matter
which it was desired to have enacted into law.” Id.
40. See Transcript of Record at 8, Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. 118 (No. 36) (relying on
Article IV and several other provisions to maintain that the U.S. Constitution requires
that “the government of the several states shall be representative in form and that the
several states shall create and maintain representative legislative assemblies”). The
initiative process was a form of direct democracy because it empowered voters to create
legislation by allowing them to submit laws to a popular vote rather than wait for their
elected representatives to pass the desired law. Id. at 137–41. The Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected the constitutional defense, and the company appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 136.
41. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 137.
42. Id. at 142.
43. Id. at 143.
44. Id. at 146.
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Having found that only Congress could determine that a state
government is unrepublican, and that Congress had not done so, the
Court dismissed the writ of error for want of jurisdiction.45
Chief Justice White’s choice of words shows that he regarded the
courts as conclusively bound by Congress’s decision to recognize the
existing government of Oregon, with that decision’s implication that
that government was republican. He said that the judiciary was
“absolutely controlled” by the legislative department, which he
described as a “tribunal.”46 Three times in one paragraph the Chief
Justice referred to recognition of a state by Congress.47 His Court had
recently reaffirmed, and soon would reiterate, the principle that
recognition of a government is a political decision that is binding on
the courts.48 In the next paragraph, Chief Justice White asked whether
the provisions of Article IV “authorize[d] the judiciary to substitute its
judgment as to a matter purely political for the judgment of Congress
on a subject committed to it.”49 Describing Congress’s action as a
“judgment” indicated that it had acted like a court, applying legal
principles to specific facts.
45. Id. at 151; see infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text (explaining the lack
of jurisdiction was statutory, not constitutional).
46. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 146.
47. Id. at 141–42.
48. In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), the Court was called on to
decide whether the acts of General Hernandez, a military commander during a civil
war in Venezuela, were those of the government of Venezuela or those of “banditti or
mere mobs.” Id. at 253. The Court found:
The acts complained of were the acts of a military commander representing
the authority of the revolutionary party as a government, which afterwards
succeeded and was recognized by the United States. We think the Circuit
Court of Appeals was justified in concluding “that the acts of the defendant
were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly
the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government.”
Id. at 254. A few years after Pacific States Telephone, in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297 (1918), the Court had before it a purported expropriation by a rebel
government of Mexico, a government that was later recognized by the United States.
Id. at 299–301. The Court treated the expropriation as a sovereign act of Mexico.
It has been specifically decided that “Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto,
of a territory is not a judicial, but is a political question, the determination of
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects
of that government. This principle has always been upheld by this court, and
has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances.”
Id. at 302 (quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)).
49. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 142.
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Pacific States Telephone was decided on grounds of non-judicial
finality: Congress’s recognition of a state government conclusively
determines that the state’s government is republican in form. The
Court had said that in Luther. Whether that statement was a holding is
not clear, but if it was a dictum in the nineteenth century, the
statement became a holding in the twentieth.50
A binding determination by a political actor may resolve a case only
in part. Luther, for example, turned not only on the lawfulness of the
Charter government, but also on its imposition of martial law. Only once
the Court had concluded that a lawful government had lawfully imposed
martial law was it able to conclude that the defense of official privilege
was available and give judgment for the defendant.51 When a court
attributes finality to the legal judgment of a non-judicial actor, the court
often goes on to decide the case on the merits, assuming that the nonjudicial decision was correct. Luther rested on political branch finality
concerning questions of sovereignty and relations among sovereigns.
Recognition of foreign governments is one example of that category.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in Baker, the courts often give final
authority to political branch conclusions regarding another
fundamental question of relations among sovereigns: war and peace.52
The courts regularly regard themselves as bound by political decisions
concerning the existence and duration of hostilities and resolve the
cases before them on the basis of those decisions.
b. The process of legal enactment
Congress may pass statutes only through the process set out in
Article I, Section 7. The Constitution may be amended only through
the process set out in Article V. The Court has found non-judicial
finality with respect to aspects of those enactment processes.
i. Federal statutes
When bills are submitted to the President for signature or veto, they
bear the statement of the Speaker of the House and President (or
President Pro Tempore) of the Senate that the House and Senate

50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224–25 (1962). Whether the courts are absolutely
bound by a political determination that an existing state government is unrepublican
is not clear. Baker says that Congress’s determination that a government is unrepublican
is binding, id., but no such determination was before the Court in that case.
51. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47–48 (1849).
52. Baker, 369 U.S. at 213–14.
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passed the bill.53 Under the Supreme Court’s enrolled bill doctrine,
courts take as conclusive the certification that a particular text was
passed by the requisite majority in Congress.54
In Field v. Clark,55 a taxpayer argued that a statute levying a tax was
invalid because the text of the document signed by the President
pursuant to congressional certification and promulgated by the
Secretary of State pursuant to statute was not the text that had been
agreed to by both houses of Congress.56 The taxpayer offered to prove
that claim with citations to the Journals of the two houses, but the
Court refused to look behind the certifications and attempt to correct
them by examining the records of congressional proceedings.57 The
certification by the Speaker and Vice President, Justice Harlan
explained, “carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative
and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively,
with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress.”58 That assurance reflects Congress’s judgment in applying
the legal rules found in Article I, Section 7 and the procedures of each
house to the particular facts of the votes on specific bills. Whether a
purported vote in the House of Representatives constituted passage of
a bill, and if so what the content of the bill was, are legal judgments.
Although it is part of the legislative process, certification that a bill was
adopted resembles adjudication in that it involves legal judgment but
no policy choice. The enrolled bill doctrine gives conclusive effect in
court to that judgment.
ii. Constitutional amendments
Like Field and the enrolled bill doctrine, the Court’s leading case on
the constitutional amendment process, Coleman v. Miller,59 also rests on
non-judicial finality under the political question rubric. In Coleman, a
majority of Justices attributed some degree of finality to congressional
decisions regarding the adoption of amendments, and derived from

53. 1 U.S.C. § 106a (2012).
54. Baker, 369 U.S. at 214 (characterizing this rule as part of the political question doctrine).
55. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
56. Id. at 667–69.
57. Id. at 668–69, 671 (noting appellant’s argument that a section that both houses
had agreed upon had been erroneously omitted from the certified bill and, although
that section was inapplicable to Field, because of the error, the President never signed
into law a bill that passed Congress, so no law was made).
58. Id. at 672.
59. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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Congress’s decisional authority a limit on the remedies courts may
afford. A majority of the Court, however, did not agree on the extent
of congressional authority, so there was no majority opinion
concerning the political question doctrine. None of the Justices who
relied on a political question rationale thought the Court lacked
jurisdiction because of the political question involved.
The events leading to Coleman began in 1924, when Congress
submitted to the state legislatures a proposed constitutional
amendment that would give Congress “power to limit, regulate, and
prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.”60 Unlike
the then-recent Eighteenth Amendment, which imposed Prohibition,
the Child Labor Amendment did not itself specify a time during which
it had to be ratified to be effective.61 The amendment proved very
controversial among the States and was not ratified in the 1920s.62 In
that decade, a number of states ratified the Amendment, some voted
on the Amendment but did not ratify it, and some affirmatively voted
to reject the Amendment.63 Kansas was one of the latter.64
In 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt urged ratification of the Child
Labor Amendment.65 Later that year, the Kansas legislature once again
deliberated on ratification.66 A resolution of ratification originated in
the state Senate, in which the Lieutenant Governor cast a purported
tie-breaking vote in favor of ratification.67 The Kansas House of
Representatives then approved the resolution.68 At that point a
number of state senators and representatives who had voted against
60. Id. at 435 n.1.
61. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 3 (repealed 1933) (providing that the
Amendment would be inoperative if the states failed to ratify it within seven years of
submission), with Child-Labor Amendment to the Constitution: Hearing on S.J. Res. 224 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1923) (providing that the Amendment
would be valid “when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States”).
62. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 451 (explaining that states met the Amendment with
adverse sentiment and that by the end of 1925, sixteen state legislatures had voted to
reject ratification and four states supported ratification).
63. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 259–61 (1996) (tracking various states’ processes for
ratification, rejection, and failure to vote from 1924 through 1929).
64. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435 (citing Kansas’s rejection of the amendment in 1925).
65. On January 7, 1937, President Roosevelt wrote to a number of governors and
governors-elect urging them to support ratification in their states. FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 657–58 (1938).
66. Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 519 (Kan. 1937).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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ratification brought an action against Miller, the Secretary of the
Kansas Senate, and other Kansas officials, in the Supreme Court of
Kansas.69 The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus directing Secretary
Miller to erase the endorsement he had put on the resolution
declaring it to have passed the Kansas Senate, and replace it with an
endorsement reading, “was not passed.”70 They also sought orders
against Miller and the other defendants restraining them from signing
the resolution and presenting it to the Governor of Kansas.71
On the merits, the plaintiffs argued that the Lieutenant Governor
had no authority to cast a vote on a constitutional amendment, and
that as a result the resolution had failed on an equally divided vote in
the Kansas Senate.72 They also argued that Kansas’s earlier vote of
rejection barred any further action by that state and that the
amendment was no longer open to ratification because a reasonable
time for ratification had passed.73 On the last point, the plaintiffs
relied on statements by the Supreme Court of the United States in a
case concerning the Eighteenth Amendment, where the Court held
that Article V implicitly limits the amendment process to a reasonable
time from proposal.74
The Supreme Court of Kansas denied the requested relief and the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed. The Kansas court
considered and rejected the petitioners’ arguments concerning Article
V.75 In the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Hughes

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 527 (citing Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374, 376 (1921)) (holding that
Congress has the power to fix a definite period for the ratification of an amendment
to the Constitution). Dillon involved a challenge to the validity of the Eighteenth
Amendment, Section 3 of which provided that the Amendment shall be inoperative if
it has not been ratified within seven years of proposal. 256 U.S. at 370–71. The
opponents of the Amendment argued that Congress did not have the power to impose
such a time limit. Id. at 371. The Court rejected that challenge, reasoning that the
Constitution itself requires that amendments be ratified within a reasonable time. Id.
at 374. Because the Constitution permits ratification only within a reasonable time,
Congress could set such a time in the amendment itself. Id. at 376.
75. In response to petitioners’ arguments, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded
that the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas could cast a tie-breaking vote on a
constitutional amendment, Coleman, 71 P.2d at 524, that a State may reject and then
subsequently validly ratify a constitutional amendment, id. at 526, and that ratification
of the Child Labor Amendment remained timely, id. at 526–27.
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wrote an opinion styled as that of the Court that did not command a
majority of the Justices on all the issues it addressed. The Chief Justice
dealt first with “the jurisdiction of this Court,” which had been
challenged on the grounds that the Kansas legislators had “no standing
to seek to have the judgment of the state court reviewed,” and that the
writ of certiorari therefore should be dismissed.76 In a decision that
remains important with respect to so-called “legislator standing,” the
Court concluded that it had jurisdiction, even though the plaintiffs did
not allege private damage.77 On that question the Chief Justice was
joined by Justices Stone, Reed, Butler, and McReynolds, and so spoke
for a majority of the Court.78
A different majority concluded that the Supreme Court of Kansas
was correct in denying relief.79 Seven Justices agreed on that
disposition and characterized ratification of constitutional
amendments as at least in part a political question for Congress to
resolve.80 Those seven divided into blocs of three and four that
differed in their reasoning, so there was no opinion for a majority on
that issue.81 All seven understood the political question doctrine as
producing a form of non-judicial finality.
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for himself and Justices Stone and
Reed, found that Congress had the final authority to decide whether a
constitutional amendment had been ratified in a timely fashion, and
that the congressional decision would be conclusive for the courts. He
asserted that “[t]he decision by the Congress, in its control of the
action of the Secretary of State, of the question whether the
amendment had been adopted within a reasonable time would not be
76. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437 (1939).
77. Id. at 445 (discussing the argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing, as the
legislators bringing suit could not show an individual and particularized injury).
78. Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion joined by Justices Roberts, Black, and
Douglas, maintained that the petitioners lacked standing. Id. at 460.
79. The Court did not address the objection to the Lieutenant Governor’s tiebreaking vote, being evenly divided as to whether that was a nonjusticiable political
question. Id. at 446–47.
80. Id. at 435, 456–57. Justices Hughes, Stone, and Reed for the Court and Justices
Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas in concurrence. Id. at 435, 456.
81. Id. at 451–52, 459–60. Justices Hughes, Stone, and Reed addressed the
question regarding limits of Congress’s power to determine what constitutes a
reasonable timeframe for ratification, ultimately finding that the proper frame was for
Congress alone to determine; Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas found
it improper for the Court to even address the question of reasonableness as the rules
of ratification are the exclusive domain of Congress and require no pronouncements
of validity by the court. Id.
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subject to review by the courts.”82 Describing his Court’s prior
decisions “as to the class of questions deemed to be political and not
justiciable,” he then explained that “[i]n determining whether a
question falls within that category, the appropriateness under our
system of government of attributing finality to the action of the
political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination are dominant considerations.”83
The Chief Justice was quite explicit in saying that political actors’
resolution of political questions can provide the courts with rules of
decision that they then can apply. Less explicit was his derivation of
the result in Coleman from that principle. He rejected a challenge to
his Court’s jurisdiction and affirmed the Supreme Court of Kansas’s
decision to deny relief, but he did not address the substance of
petitioners’ arguments under Article V. How could Chief Justice
Hughes have thought it proper to exercise jurisdiction and affirm
without fully resolving the merits?
Although the Chief Justice did not explain that point in depth, his
opinion indicates that affirmance was appropriate because judgment
for the plaintiffs would have interfered with Congress’s decisional
process. In the Kansas court, the plaintiffs had sought orders that
would prevent the transmission to the national government of a
certification that Kansas had ratified. Judicial relief of that kind would
have intercepted Kansas’s certification, and kept Congress from
passing on its validity. Chief Justice Hughes believed that Congress was
to decide on the validity of that purported act. After explaining that
the reasonableness of time for ratification presents political and not
judicial questions, he said that “[t]hey can be decided by the Congress
with the full knowledge and appreciation . . . of the political, social[,]
and economic conditions which have prevailed during the period
82. Id. at 454. In referring to Congress’s control of the action of the Secretary of
State, the Chief Justice apparently had the circumstances surrounding the
promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment in mind. In response to the Secretary
of State’s doubts as to whether the Amendment had been ratified, Congress in 1868
declared that it had been ratified and directed the Secretary to promulgate it. Id. at
448–49. According to Chief Justice Hughes, “This decision by the political
departments of the Government as to the validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been accepted.” Id. at 449–50. Of all the amendments to the
Constitution, only the Fourteenth was promulgated in response to specific
congressional direction. Chief Justice Hughes did not base his argument about
congressional power on the text of Article V, which makes no reference to any
congressional role in promulgation.
83. Id. at 454–55.
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since the submission of the amendment.”84 The question of reasonable
time would be “an open one for the consideration of the Congress
when, in the presence of certified ratifications by three-fourths of the
States, the time arrives for the promulgation of the adoption of the
amendment.”85 That time can arrive only if certifications of ratification
are before Congress, which they will not be if the relevant state officers
are blocked from submitting them by court order.
In the opinion’s penultimate paragraph, the Chief Justice repeated
that Congress “has the final determination of the question” regarding
lapse of time, and that therefore “[t]he state officials should not be
restrained from certifying to the Secretary of State the adoption by the
legislature of Kansas of the resolution of ratification.”86 A judicial
order restraining certification would keep Congress from resolving the
question, while denial of relief would give the national legislature an
opportunity to make a final determination. The implication is that
when the final decision is for Congress to make, the courts should not
give remedies that keep from the legislature the official records that it
needs to perform its quasi-judicial function.
Justice Black, speaking for himself and Justices Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas, was equally clear that the political question doctrine gave
Congress authority conclusively to resolve a contested question of law
and fact. Ratification of constitutional amendments is a political
question, and “decision of a ‘political question’ by the ‘political
department’ to which the Constitution has committed it ‘conclusively
binds the judges, as well as other officials, citizens[,] and subjects of . . .
government.’”87 Proclamation of an amendment under the authority
of Congress “will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that
ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands,” and when
that assurance is given, “a proclaimed amendment must be accepted
as part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional
authority of interpretation.”88 That is non-judicial finality.

84. Id. at 454.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 456.
87. Id. at 457 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
212 (1890)).
88. Id. at 457–58. Like the Chief Justice, Justice Black did not explain how
promulgation by the Secretary of State pursuant to a general statutory directive to
promulgate validly ratified amendments could constitute a determination or assurance
by Congress that any particular amendment had been ratified.
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Justice Black declined to join the Chief Justice’s reasoning, because
Chief Justice Hughes’s understanding of congressional finality was too
limited for him. Justice Black thought that the Chief Justice
understated “Congress[‘s] . . . sole and complete control over the
amending process, subject to no judicial review.”89 Although he
treated ratification as a political question, the Chief Justice had cited
the Court’s earlier statement that amendments must be ratified within
a reasonable time.90 In Justice Black’s view, the Court should have said
nothing about the rules governing ratification, other than to
disapprove its earlier statements on the subject, because “Congress . . .
cannot be bound by and is under no duty to accept the
pronouncements upon [its] exclusive power by this Court or the
Kansas courts,” and any judicial discussion of the topic “is a mere
admonition to the Congress in the nature of an advisory opinion.”91
Like Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Black thought that congressional
finality on political question grounds meant that the Supreme Court
of Kansas had been right to withhold relief. Justice Black did not
propose to vacate the Kansas court’s judgment or reverse with
instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.92 He said that
judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of
a “reasonable time” within which Congress may accept
ratification . . . and kindred questions, are all consistent only with an
ultimate control over the amending process in the courts. And this
must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to
judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the
Constitution solely to the political branch of government.93

Justice Black’s reference to judicial control and interference, in
addition to judicial pronouncements, indicates that a decree that
would prevent a certification from reaching Congress was as
impermissible as any judicial statements about Article V. A decree like
the mandamus that Coleman requested from the Kansas court would
interfere with congressional decision making by limiting the official
records on which Congress could base its decision. But according to
Justice Black, “[t]he [amendment] process itself is ‘political’ in its
89. Id. at 459.
90. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
91. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 459–60 (Black, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 469–70 (writing that he would have dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court of the United States, but not indicating that the restrictions on his
Court’s authority translated to a similar want of jurisdiction in the Kansas court).
93. Id. at 458.
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entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control[,] or
interference at any point.”94 In his view, that was why the Supreme
Court of Kansas was right to deny mandamus, though he believed it
was wrong to have discussed the substance of Article V in its reasoning.
Coleman thus turned on non-judicial finality. It differed from Luther
and Field v. Clark because the relevant political actor had not yet
supplied the courts with a decision that they could treat as conclusive.
The Court was not being asked to respect a congressional action
promulgating the Child Labor Amendment. Nor was Coleman a case
in which a court could make a provisional decision subject to later
correction by a conclusive political act. Had the courts granted the
relief requested, the federal government would not have received
notification from Kansas that the state had ratified. If thirty-five other
states had notified the Secretary of State of their ratification, but
Kansas had not done so, Congress would not have been in a position
to decide if Kansas had validly ratified and if the amendment had
therefore become part of the Constitution.95 That feature of the case,
combined with all seven Justices’ concern that the courts not interfere
with congressional resolution of the timeliness issue, suggest that seven
Justices concluded that the courts may not prejudice political
resolution of a political question by issuing an order that affects the
process through which that resolution takes place.
This aspect of the political question doctrine, like the aspect
concerning recognition of sovereign relations, accords conclusive
force to non-judicial decisions that apply legal rules to specific facts.
b. Congressional adjudicative authority
Some provisions of the Constitution assign adjudicative authority to
a house of Congress. Article II, Section 4 provides that “[t]he
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”96 Article
I, Section 2 gives “the sole Power of Impeachment” to the House,97 and
Section 3 provides that “the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all

94. Id. at 459.
95. At the time of Coleman, ratification required thirty-six of the forty-eight States
then in the Union.
96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
97. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
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Impeachments.”98 Section 5 of Article I states that each house of
Congress “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members.”99
In the exercise of those functions, the House and Senate apply law
to fact to resolve legal disputes. They perform functions more usually
performed by courts, and the Constitution uses “judge” and “try” to
describe those functions. Under the rubric of the political question
doctrine, the Supreme Court gives substantial finality to congressional
decisions pursuant to these powers. With respect to contested
elections for the House and Senate, the Court’s position is that the
relevant political decision maker’s judgment is absolutely final.
Roudebush v. Hartke100 involved the extremely close 1970 election for
Senate in Indiana. Incumbent Senator Vance Hartke was certified the
winner by a narrow margin, and his opponent, Richard Roudebush,
sought a recount under Indiana law.101 Hartke then sought an
injunction against the recount in federal district court, arguing that it
was unlawful because of the Senate’s power to judge elections, returns,
and qualifications of its members.102 While that litigation was in
progress, the Senate seated Hartke, doing so explicitly without
prejudice to the recount and the related litigation.103
The Supreme Court concluded that Indiana’s recount procedure
was lawful, as it was part of the state election process that would
ultimately be reviewed by the Senate.104 The result of that review would
be conclusive. “Which candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate
is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question.”105 The Indiana
recount process, including its judicial component, could go forward
because it was in service of, and not prejudicial to, the Senate’s action
as judge of the election. “Once this case is resolved and the Senate is
assured that it has received the final Indiana tally, the Senate will be

98. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
99. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
100. 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
101. Id. at 16–17.
102. Id. at 17 (claiming that the recount was prohibited under Article 1, Section 5
of the U.S. Constitution); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
103. Id. at 18.
104. “A recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the
election any more than the initial count does. The Senate is free to accept or reject
the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct its own recount.”
Id. at 25–26 (footnotes omitted).
105. Id. at 19.
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free to make an unconditional and final judgment under Art. I, § 5.”106
Final judgments are made by institutions that conclusively apply law to
fact. In Roudebush, that institution was the Senate.
The question of congressional finality arose a few years earlier in
Powell v. McCormack,107 which involved the qualifications of U.S.
Representatives. Adam Clayton Powell, elected to the House from New
York, sought a declaration that his exclusion from the 90th Congress
had been unlawful.108 The Court concluded that the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction under Article III and the statutes.109 It then
turned to justiciability, which it explicitly distinguished from subject
matter jurisdiction, and to the political question doctrine as an aspect
of justiciability.110 The Court addressed the Respondents’ argument
that “this case presents a political question because, under Art. I, § 5,
there has been a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment’
to the House of the ‘adjudicatory power’ to determine Powell’s
qualifications.”111
The Court understood that question as turning on the House’s final
decisional authority. If Article I, Section 5 “gives the House judicially
unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to judge
whether prospective members meet those qualifications, further
review of the House determination might well be barred by the
political question doctrine.”112 But “if the Constitution gives the House
power to judge only whether elected members possess the three
standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution, further
consideration would be necessary to determine whether any of the
other formulations of the political question doctrine” the Court had
106. Id.
107. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
108. Powell was excluded as a result of an investigation into alleged irregularities in
his official expenses. Id. at 489–93. By the time the Court decided Powell v. McCormack,
he had already been seated for the 91st Congress and had been fined for financial
misconduct. Id. at 494–95. The Court concluded that the case was not moot, because
a declaration could still bear on his claim for pay from the 90th Congress, id. at 495–
500, and that it was not barred by the Speech or Debate Clause because Powell properly
sought relief from officers of the House who were not Representatives themselves. Id.
at 505–06.
109. Id. at 512.
110. Id. (“As we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962), there is a
significant difference between determining whether a federal court has ‘jurisdiction
of the subject matter’ and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject
matter jurisdiction is ‘justiciable.’”).
111. Id. at 519.
112. Id. at 520.
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previously identified applied to the case.113 After an extensive review
of the history, the Court concluded that neither House has authority
to impose qualifications beyond those set out in the Constitution,
reasoning that “Art. I, § 5, is at most a ‘textually demonstrable
commitment’ to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set
forth in the Constitution. Therefore, the ‘textual commitment’
formulation of the political question doctrine does not bar federal
courts from adjudicating petitioners’ claims.”114 In assessing the two
houses’ function as “judge” of elections and qualifications, the Court
found that their decisions were final only to a limited extent.115
Perhaps the clearest example of non-judicial adjudication in the
Constitution is the Senate’s sole power to try all impeachments. The
meaning of that provision, and the location of the power to interpret
and apply it, came before the Court in Nixon v. United States.116 Walter
Nixon, a U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Mississippi, was
impeached by the House of Representatives.117 In his impeachment
trial, the Senate took testimony before a committee rather than in a
session of the Senate as a whole.118 The record created before the
committee was then available to each Senator, and a session of the full
Senate was held at which the House impeachment managers and Judge
Nixon’s counsel presented argument and Judge Nixon addressed the
Senate.119 Nixon objected to the Senate’s procedure and after his
conviction and removal brought suit in federal district court, seeking
a declaration that his removal was void and that he was entitled to
reinstatement as a federal judge and back pay.120 The district court
dismissed his claim as nonjusticiable, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.121
Nixon v. United States holds that the Senate’s decisions on
impeachment are substantially final on political question grounds,
though the exact scope of the finality the Court attributed to the
113. Id. at 520–21 (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. at 548. After resolving that primary question, the Court dealt briefly with
other considerations, including the elements of political question cases that had been
listed in Baker. Id. at 548–49.
115. Id. at 550.
116. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
117. Id. at 226–27.
118. Id. at 227 & n.1.
119. Id. at 227–28.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 228, 238. The District Court concluded that the claim was
nonjusticiable and the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
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Senate is not entirely clear. The Court may have held that a Senate
judgment of conviction is absolutely final and subject to no
reconsideration by the courts. It is also possible that, like Powell, Nixon
v. United States recognized a narrower form of finality as to an issue, not
the result and everything that went into it. The specific issue was
whether the procedures the Senate used qualified as a trial under
Article I, Section 5.
Elements of the Court’s reasoning point to the broad rationale.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted that the House
has the “sole” power of impeachment and the Senate the “sole” power
to try all impeachments.122 In his view, “the word ‘sole’ indicates that
this authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else.”123 That
means that “the Senate alone shall have authority to determine
whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted.”124 The Chief
Justice then considered the Federal Convention’s decision to move
impeachment trials from the Supreme Court to the Senate.125 He
explained that “the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular,
were not chosen to have any role in impeachments.”126 A decision to
exclude the courts completely would not be confined to keeping them
from deciding whether the Senate had truly tried an impeachment.
That line of reasoning suggests that Senate judgments of conviction
are absolutely final, and that the courts may not independently decide
any question on which such a judgment rests.
On the other hand, the Court also pointed out that “the use of the
word ‘try’ in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks
sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of
review of the Senate’s actions.”127 The breadth of that term is relevant
specifically with respect to judicial determination whether there has
been a trial, not with respect to other issues that might come up
concerning impeachment. Moreover, the Court said that the question
was whether the Constitution contained a textually demonstrable
commitment of “the issue” to a political actor.128 That may have been
an accident of phrasing, or it may have represented the Court’s

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 231.
Id. at 233–35.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 228, 230.
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understanding that a commitment of only one issue—what constitutes
an impeachment—was at stake.
Nixon v. United States found substantial non-judicial finality under the
political question rubric. Most likely the case means that Senate
impeachments are absolutely conclusive as far as the courts are
concerned, but the opinion can be read more narrowly. Each of the
three leading cases in which the Court has relied on the political
question doctrine—Luther, Coleman, and Nixon v. United States—rests
on non-judicial finality. In all three, the Court found that the judiciary
was absolutely bound by a political actor’s decision that applied legal
rules to specific facts.
2. Remedies that would direct political discretion
John Marshall said that “[q]uestions, in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can
never be made in this [C]ourt.”129 That conclusion followed from the
principle that “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.”130 That
principle would not keep the court from issuing a writ of mandamus
ordering that Madison deliver Marbury’s commission, Marshall explained,
because while mandamus is confined to requiring the performance of
non-discretionary, ministerial duties, delivering the commission would
involve no exercise of discretion by an executive officer.131
Contemporary political question doctrine incorporates the principle
that courts may not grant remedies that would control non-judicial
decisions to an impermissible extent. The Supreme Court applied that
principle in Gilligan v. Morgan,132 an injunctive proceeding against the
Governor of Ohio that grew out of the deaths at Kent State University.
According to the plaintiffs, the confrontation between demonstrators
and the Ohio National Guard had led to fatalities because the Guard
was ill-trained and improperly equipped to deal with civil disturbances.133
The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.134 The court of appeals reversed in part and
129. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 171–73.
132. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
133. Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 1972), rev’d sub nom. Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (quoting the facts of the case as they appear in the complaint).
134. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 3.
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remanded, instructing the district court to determine whether the
Ohio National Guard’s “pattern of training, weaponry and orders”
made the use of lethal force inevitable in circumstances in which that level
of force was not reasonably necessary.135 In dissent, Judge Celebrezze
argued that there was “no conceivable relief” the district court could
grant because “any such relief would present a nonjusticiable political
question.”136 The court of appeals majority responded that if called on
to award injunctive relief, the district court “will find much material
available for devising a suitable remedy”; for example, as in the report
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.137
The Supreme Court reversed.138 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, began by stressing that military decisions are not per se exempt
from judicial examination.139 Gilligan was not a damages action
growing out of the Kent State tragedy, nor one “seeking a restraining
order against some specified and imminently threatened unlawful
action.”140 It was “a broad call on judicial power to assume continuing
regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the Ohio National
Guard.”141 The plaintiffs wanted the district court to “establish
standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind of
orders to control the actions of the National Guard,” and then to
“exercise a continuing judicial surveillance over the Guard to assure
compliance” with its order.142 In the Supreme Court’s view, such an
order would exert too much judicial control over government actions
that the Constitution leaves to the electorally accountable branches.143
Courts are not suited either to make military decisions or to supervise
them. “The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are
essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian
control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”144
Having found that formulating riot-control policy would require
judicial resolution of nonjusticiable political questions, the Court

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Morgan, 456 F.2d at 612.
Id. at 618 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
Id. at 614.
Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 10.
Id.
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reiterated that military decisions could under other circumstances be
tested by courts for their legality. “[W]e neither hold nor imply that
the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or
that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for violations
of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel, whether
by way of damages or injunctive relief.”145 Extensive judicial control of
military policy was not permissible, but military decisions were still
subject to the law.
The Court promptly kept its implicit promise in Scheuer v. Rhodes,146
a damages action for wrongful death arising from the events at Kent
State. The plaintiffs sought recovery from the personal funds of
Governor Rhodes and other Ohio civilian and military officials.147 The
Supreme Court concluded that the defendants did not enjoy sovereign
immunity.148 They had only the qualified immunity that protects
officials when their acts are not clearly unlawful.149 Qualified immunity
would enable decision makers to “act swiftly and firmly”150 while
preserving the possibility of “accountability in a judicial forum for
violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel,
whether by way of damages or injunctive relief.”151
Taken together, Gilligan and Scheuer show that the branch of the
political question doctrine at work in the former case forbids judicial
displacement of discretion, not the application of legal standards to
military decisions. The remedy at issue in Gilligan was a classic
prophylactic injunction.152 Plaintiffs asked the district court to impose
on the Ohio National Guard detailed rules that were not legally
required, but that were designed to reduce the likelihood of events like
those at Kent State. Such an order would constrain the policy
discretion of another government actor to take otherwise-lawful
measures. Gilligan stands for the proposition that when the decisions
145. Id. at 11–12 (footnote omitted).
146. 416 U.S. 232 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 814–15 (1982).
147. Id. at 234.
148. Id. at 237–39 (noting that sovereign immunity protects the government itself,
not government officials against whom recovery is sought from their personal funds).
149. Id. at 247–48.
150. Id. at 246.
151. Id. at 249 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1973)).
152. See generally ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 293 (4th
ed. 2007) (defining a prophylactic injunction as a method “to safeguard the plaintiff’s
rights by directing the defendant’s behavior so as to minimize the chance that wrongs
might recur in the future”).
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involved are about military discretion, the separation of judicial and
executive power imposes limits on the courts’ remedial authority.153
A leading nineteenth century political question case also falls into
this category. Mississippi v. Johnson154 invokes Marbury and the
distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions in rejecting
a suit against the Executive. Under the Reconstruction Acts of 1867,
Congress placed the then-existing governments of the former
Confederate states under military supervision, and provided for the
establishment of new governments created through acts of popular
sovereignty administered by the U.S. Army.155 Mississippi asked the
Supreme Court for leave to file a bill in equity against President
Andrew Johnson in the Court’s state-citizen diversity original
jurisdiction (Johnson was sued as a citizen of Tennessee).156 The Court
rejected the bill on the grounds that the injunction it sought would
subject presidential actions in “exercise of the power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed to judicial control.”157 Actions of that kind
were “in no just sense ministerial” but “purely executive and
political.”158 Marbury, the Court explained, was not to the contrary,
because it involved a ministerial duty, “a simple, definite duty, arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.”159
Today, the Court apparently regards Mississippi v. Johnson as limiting
judicial decrees directed to the President himself.160 As Gilligan shows,

153. The Court in Baker stressed that all of its earlier political question cases had
involved the national separation of powers, not the relations between state and national
governments. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). A few years later it decided Gilligan,
in which the defendant was the Governor of Ohio, on political question grounds. Gilligan,
413 U.S. at 12. The doctrine thus to some extent operates to protect decisions by state,
and not just federal, political actors. The Court has not had occasion to decide
whether a state political decision can give rise to non-judicial finality of the kind
attributed to the federal political branches in cases like Luther and Coleman. Nor has it
been called on to decide whether state courts may exert the kind of control over state
political actors that may not be exerted over the federal political branches.
154. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
155. Id. at 475–77.
156. Id. at 475.
157. Id. at 499.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 498.
160.
While injunctive relief against executive officials like the Secretary of
Commerce is within the courts’ power . . . the District Court’s grant of
injunctive relief against the President himself is extraordinary, and should
have raised judicial eyebrows. We have left open the question whether the
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however, the Court has not abandoned the principle that there are
limits to judicial control of executive discretion, and it still uses the
distinction between judicial and political power in referring to those limits.
A branch of the political question doctrine enforces that distinction.161
B. Jurisdiction, Justiciability, and Decision on the Merits
Today’s Court has indicated in dicta that the political question
doctrine limits the power of Article III courts to decide certain cases.162

President might be subject to a judicial injunction requiring the performance
of a purely “ministerial” duty . . . and we have held that the President may be
subject to a subpoena to provide information relevant to an ongoing criminal
prosecution . . . but in general “this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin
the President in the performance of his official duties.”
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1992) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 501).
161. Speaking for a plurality of the Court in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946)
(plurality opinion), Justice Frankfurter concluded that a challenge to alleged
malapportionment of congressional districts should be dismissed for want of equity.
Id. at 556. In Justice Frankfurter’s view, the complaint asked “of this Court what is
beyond its competence to grant” because it called on the judiciary “to reconstruct the
electoral process of Illinois.” Id. at 552. “Of course no court can affirmatively re-map
the Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards of
fairness for a representative system.” Id. at 553. Congress, by contrast, could deal with
the problem if there was one. Id. at 554. Justice Frankfurter relied on limits on the
federal courts’ remedial authority and cited Mississippi v. Johnson. Id. at 556. Justice
Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove fits in the line of decisions that include Mississippi v.
Johnson and Gilligan.
162. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Court explained that it is
“familiar learning that no justiciable ‘controversy’ exists when parties seek adjudication of
a political question.” Id. at 516 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)). As
in Luther, the Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA on the merits. 549 U.S. at 527. In
describing the lower court’s decision in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012), the
Court rejected the court of appeals’s holding that “the courts lacked authority to
decide the case because it presented a political question,” id. at 191, but apparently
not the premise that if the case did present a political question the courts could not
decide it. Having concluded that the case presented no political question, the Court
remanded so that the court of appeals could decide the merits. Id. at 202.
Justice Scalia recently characterized the political question rationale of Coleman
as “a rejection of jurisdiction” and cited Zivotofsky, a case decided more than eighty
years after Coleman, for that characterization of the political question doctrine. Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2696–97 (2015)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Because he assumed that the political question doctrine is a
limit on jurisdiction, Justice Scalia regarded the Court’s resolution of the standing
question in Coleman as “quite superfluous and arguably nothing but dictum.” Id. at
2697. The Court in Coleman explicitly rejected a challenge to its jurisdiction based on
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The Court has never held that there is such a limitation, however. This
Section shows that the Supreme Court’s cases that apply the political
question doctrine do not regard it as a limit on the jurisdiction of
Article III courts. It discusses the cases in which the Court has relied
on the doctrine, and then turns to Baker v. Carr, which, like earlier
decisions, treated the doctrine as a source of non-judicial finality, not
lack of jurisdiction.
1. The Court’s political question decisions
Despite the political question doctrine’s close relation to the limits
on federal judicial power, it is not a limit on subject matter jurisdiction
as the Court uses that concept. The political question doctrine has
figured in the decision of cases in three ways, none of which involves a
lack of jurisdiction under Article III. First, the political question
doctrine may require that a court decide on the merits, accepting an
earlier political decision. Second, it may bar a court from granting
relief that would improperly interfere with a political decision. Third,
in applying it, a state court may be so clearly correct that its decision
presents no substantial federal question in the statutory appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. After
describing the three contexts, this Section will undertake to better
understand the concept of justiciability, which the Court has not fully
elaborated.
a. Decision on the merits based on a political actor’s legal judgment
Perhaps the most straightforward application of the political
question doctrine appeared in Luther.163 The Supreme Court accepted
the political branches’ judgment that the established government was
legitimate, and used it to assess Luther’s claim for damages, which was
rejected on the merits. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s
judgment, and did not reverse with instructions to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction. Field v. Clark worked the same way. Having concluded
that the text of an Act certified by Congress was authoritative, the
Court decided the case before it on that basis.164 Field no more involved
a lack of jurisdiction than does a case that turns in part on the

standing and then affirmed the Supreme Court of Kansas, which had decided the case
on the merits. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1939).
163. See supra notes 8–37 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
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preclusive effect of a prior judgment. Non-judicial finality often
operates in the same fashion as judicial finality.
Because of the political question doctrine, the decision of a nonjudicial actor can provide a premise that the court uses in a decision
on the merits. As a result, the doctrine can support a decision in favor
of the plaintiff, which a limit on jurisdiction cannot do. In the
nineteenth century recognition case Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,165
the defendant insurance company refused to pay when the insured’s
vessel was seized by the government of Buenos Ayres (as Argentina was
then known).166 That seizure followed a warning by Argentine officials
that the Falkland Islands were Argentine territory, not open to
American fishing vessels.167 The insurance company argued that the
policy did not cover seizure under those circumstances. The insured
responded that the master of its vessel had acted reasonably in
response to the Argentine threat by asserting the right of American
citizens to operate in the Falklands, which the U.S. Executive did not
recognize as part of Argentina.168 The Court found that the Executive’s
conclusion regarding sovereignty over the Falklands was conclusive,
and that in light of that conclusion the master had acted reasonably.169
The plaintiff prevailed, relying in part on the Executive’s conclusive
determination of sovereign rights. As that case shows, deference to the
legal decision of a political actor does not deprive a court of jurisdiction.
b. Political autonomy and unavailability of relief
In other situations, the political question doctrine prevents the court
from granting relief. In those cases, the doctrine bars relief whether
or not the defendant’s conduct is lawful and so limits the issues the
court addresses. The doctrine does not, however, operate as a limitation
on subject matter jurisdiction under Article III. When it produces that
result, the political question doctrine functions much like a limit on

165. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 417.
168. Id. at 420.
169.
And we think in the present case, as the executive, in his message, and in his
correspondence with the government of Buenos Ayres, has denied the
jurisdiction which it has assumed to exercise over the Falkland [I]slands; the
fact must be taken and acted on by this Court as thus asserted and maintained.
Id. at 420. With that premise in place, the Court concluded that the master of the
vessel took no risk that would relieve the insurers of liability on the policy. Id. at 421.
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equitable relief, such as the requirement that the remedy at law be
inadequate. If a court applying traditional rules about equitable relief
concludes that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, it will deny
equitable relief without deciding whether the defendant is a
wrongdoer and will be exercising its jurisdiction in doing so.170
Either branch of the doctrine can require a court to deny a remedy
without an inquiry into the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct.
Coleman shows how non-judicial finality can require that a court
withhold relief. The seven Justices who decided the case on political
question grounds did so because judicial relief that prevented Kansas
from reporting its purported ratification would interfere with a
congressional decision that, if made, would be conclusive on the
courts. The other branch of the doctrine, found in Gilligan, readily
falls into this category because it is formulated as a limit on relief. As
Scheuer demonstrated, the Court in Gilligan was concerned with
decrees that would intrude into military discretion, not damages
judgments based only on whether a use of force was lawful. In Gilligan,
the Court was able to decide that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the
relief they requested without deciding all of the issues they raised.
Because the injunction that the plaintiffs asked for could not be
granted, the courts did not have to assess the Ohio National Guard’s
propensity to use force unlawfully.
In both Coleman and Gilligan, the Court exercised jurisdiction, and
denied relief without resolving all the questions the plaintiffs raised.171
When the political question doctrine makes relief unavailable on the
facts as pled by the plaintiff, the complaint will be subject to dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.172 When
applicable legal principles require that the plaintiff be denied a
favorable decree, the plaintiff has not stated a claim on which relief
can be granted. That conclusion can follow from principles governing
remedies, just as it can follow from principles governing other

170. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
171. In Coleman the Supreme Court of Kansas had resolved the issues the plaintiffs
raised under Article V, but the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that
judgment on a different ground, relying on the political question doctrine to do so.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1939).
172. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted”).
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components of the plaintiff’s claim for relief, including the substance
of the dispute between the parties.173
Gilligan illustrates the point that cases like it are properly dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(6), not for want of jurisdiction. The district court
had dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.174 The court of appeals reversed that judgment in part, and
the Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals.175 The Court
thereby reinstated a dismissal based not a lack of jurisdiction, but on
the legal principles governing the parties’ dispute. The Court
understood the question to involve the availability of relief, not the
courts’ jurisdiction. It began its inquiry into justiciability by asking, if
the facts alleged by the plaintiffs were true, “whether there is any relief
a District Court could appropriately fashion.”176 Having answered that
question in the negative, because the decree contemplated would
require that a court make military judgments, the Court reinstated the
district court’s disposition of the case.177
By treating the political question doctrine as grounds for dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court used the structure set out in
Baker v. Carr, which is discussed in depth below. In Baker, the Court
explicitly distinguished between subject matter jurisdiction and
justiciability. The district court in Baker had dismissed on the grounds
that it lacked jurisdiction and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim
on which relief could be granted.178 The Supreme Court identified

173. For example, the allegations in a complaint that seeks an injunction under
standard equitable principles must support the conclusion that the plaintiff is
threatened with irreparable injury and would have only an inadequate remedy at law.
See, e.g., Pine Twp. Citizens’ Ass’n v. Arnold, 453 F. Supp. 594, 597–98 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
(asserting that before convening a three-judge court, a single judge must determine
whether a complaint formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, including irreparable
injury and inadequacy of the remedy at law).
174. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 3 (1973) (citing Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d
608, 608–09 (6th Cir. 1972) (noting the dismissal in district court for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted). The court of appeals made the same point
below in Morgan v. Rhodes. 456 F.2d at 608–09 (“The District Judge dismissed the
complaint on motion without either answer or affidavits being filed by appellees, and
without hearing. His brief order stated that the pleading failed to state a claim
cognizable under federal law.”).
175. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 12; Morgan, 456 F.2d at 615.
176. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5.
177. Id. at 10–12.
178. In the three-judge district court, the defendants had moved to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
and failure to join indispensable parties. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D.
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those grounds as first “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” and then
“failure to state a justiciable cause of action.”179 It considered and
rejected the political question argument under the second heading.180
Nixon v. United States, which like Gilligan but unlike Baker was decided
under the political question doctrine, follows the same pattern. In that
case the district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction,
and that “[t]he availability of the judicial remedy sought by plaintiff
depends, therefore, on whether the controversy here is justiciable.”181
The district court thus believed that non-justiciability would make
relief unavailable in a case within the court’s jurisdiction. Concluding
that the case was not justiciable, the district court dismissed on that
ground.182 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “Walter
Nixon’s claim is not justiciable.”183 The Supreme Court affirmed that
judgment. All three courts believed that it was possible for a case to be
within the federal courts’ jurisdiction but not to be justiciable.
The courts in Gilligan used the now-familiar concept found in Rule
12(b)(6) to categorize cases in which the political question doctrine
means that no relief will be available although the court has
jurisdiction. Earlier terminology from equity practice may be a source
of confusion on this score because as Justice Holmes explained,
“Courts sometimes say that there is no jurisdiction in equity when they
mean only that equity ought not to give the relief asked.”184 When

Tenn. 1959) (per curiam), rev’d, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The district court dismissed on
the first two grounds and did not address the third. Id. at 828.
179. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196, 208–09 (1962).
180. Id. at 208–09 (considering political question doctrine under the justiciability
heading).
181. Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9, 11–12 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 506 U.S. 224
(1993). Judge Nixon had sought a declaration that his conviction by the Senate was
void. Id. at 10.
182. Id. at 14. The United States had asserted as defenses that the complaint failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, and that the action was nonjusticiable. Brief for Respondents &
Amicus Curiae United States Senate at 12–13, Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9
(D.D.C. 1990) (No. 91-740). The district court did not indicate whether it understood
dismissal for non-justiciability as a form of dismissal for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted.
183. Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
184. Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926). Immediately after that
sentence, Holmes continued, “In a strict sense the [lower c]ourt in this case had
jurisdiction. It had power to grant an injunction, and if it had granted one its decree,
although wrong, would not have been void.” Id. The plaintiffs claimed that
Massachusetts’s daylight savings time statutes were preempted by federal legislation on
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courts say they lack jurisdiction in equity they do not mean that they
lack the authority to decide the case on the grounds that the parties or
the subject matter are outside their jurisdiction. They mean that no
relief will be granted, often because of principles that govern equitable
remedies and do not require that the court resolve all the issues
disputed between the parties. When the plaintiff is subject to laches,
for example, the court can decide that equitable relief is unavailable

the subject. The court below found that the plaintiffs had not made the requisite
showing for a preliminary injunction: that the case was “reasonably free from doubt”
and that they faced “great and irreparable injury.” Mass. State Grange v. Benton,
10 F.2d 515, 515–16 (D. Mass. 1925) (per curiam) (three-judge district court). The
district court then went on to address the substance of plaintiffs’ challenge, and found
that the state and federal laws were consistent. Having reached that conclusion, the
court found it unnecessary to “discuss the serious jurisdictional questions raised, either
as to the rights of the plaintiffs or as to any power vested in the defendants by the
Massachusetts act to enforce that act.” Id. at 517 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923)). The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Justice Holmes.
Benton, 272 U.S. at 529. He endorsed the district court’s finding that state and federal
law did not conflict in a single sentence, and then went on to emphasize “the important
rule . . . that no injunction ought to issue against officers of a State clothed with
authority to enforce the law in question, unless in a case reasonably free from doubt
and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.” Id. at 527 (citation
omitted). Having found that the case before him was not an exception to that general
principle of equity, Justice Holmes then made the point that courts sometimes say they
have no jurisdiction when they mean that no relief is available under equitable
principles. Id. at 528. Perhaps to emphasize the distinction, he concluded that “upon
the merits we think it too plain to need argument that to grant an injunction upon the
allegations of this bill would be to fly in the face of the rule which, as we have said, we
think should be very strictly observed.” Id. at 528–29. The point that the case was
decided on the merits and not on a jurisdictional ground was not lost on Justice
McReynolds, who in a separate opinion said that the suit was actually against the State
of Massachusetts, not its officers, and so was excluded from federal jurisdiction by the
Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 529.
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without having to decide whether the plaintiff’s claims are otherwise
meritorious.185 Political question cases often have that feature.186
When the political question doctrine bars the relief the plaintiff seeks,
the case is properly dismissed under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, but not for want of jurisdiction.

185. A plaintiff in equity who has delayed unreasonably may be denied relief, or
granted only limited relief, under the equitable doctrine of laches. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES 75 (2d ed. 1993). The independence of laches and the merits is
demonstrated by another principle Dobbs discusses, according to which the defense
of laches may be limited to delay that prejudiced the defendant. As a result, a plaintiff
complaining of trademark infringement may be barred from retrospective relief by
laches but entitled to a prospective injunction. Id. at 76. In such situations, the
defendant’s conduct is by hypothesis infringing, but retrospective relief is denied
despite that feature of the merits.
In discussing another traditional equitable principle, the requirement that the
remedy at law be inadequate, Dobbs makes the point about misleading references to
lack of “jurisdiction.”
A traditional locution of equity courts referred to the body of equity precedent
and practice as “equity jurisdiction.” Sometimes a bill in equity would be
dismissed because there was no “equity jurisdiction,” and sometimes this
phrase was used in dismissing an equitable claim under the adequacy rule. But
equity jurisdiction is not jurisdictional in the modern procedural sense.
Id. at 88. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove agreed with the district court that the case
should be dismissed “for want of equity” because the relief the plaintiff sought was
beyond the courts’ authority to grant. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551–52
(1946).
186. The potentially confusing terminology that Holmes and Dobbs discuss is used
in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), which was a political question
case insofar as it held that a court could not control a discretionary function. Refusing
Mississippi leave to file, Chief Justice Chase said that “this court has no jurisdiction of
a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.” Id. at 501. He
did not deny that the case fell into the Court’s original jurisdiction under Article III—
Mississippi had sued a citizen of another state, President Johnson being from
Tennessee—but did conclude that no injunction would be issued. That conclusion
rested on the unavailability of remedies that would control executive or political
discretion. Id. at 499 (concluding that the President’s function under the
Reconstruction Acts was not ministerial, but executive and political). Chief Justice
Chase likely believed that that for a court to enjoin an executive official with respect
to a proposed non-ministerial act that was neither a tort nor an enforcement
proceeding would have been to exercise political and not judicial power. Neither the
executive nor the legislature, Chief Justice Chase wrote, “can be restrained in its action
by the judicial department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper
cases, subject to its cognizance.” Id. at 500. That statement and its caveat suggest that
any constitutional problem was specifically with the remedy. The reference to proper
cases suggests, for example, that if one of those statutes bore on a dispute between
private people, or an ex post action for damages against an officer, the courts would
perform their usual function of assessing constitutionality.
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c. Substantial federal questions in the Supreme Court of the United States
Like most legal principles, the Court’s political question doctrine
has some straightforward applications. Because that doctrine is one of
federal law, state courts are required to apply it. When the Supreme
Court had much more mandatory appellate jurisdiction over the state
courts than it has today, the Court developed the principle that an
appeal from a state court decision that presented no substantial federal
question could be dismissed for want of statutory jurisdiction instead
of being decided on the merits.187 If the state court was clearly correct
under the Court’s precedent, an appeal presented no substantial
federal question.188 Perhaps paradoxically, a conclusion about the merits
of the federal question implied that the Court had no jurisdiction under
the statute governing appeals from state courts. In the same line of
cases, the Court came to the conclusion that when a state court was
obviously right, either affirmance, or dismissal for want of a substantial
federal question, was a permissible outcome.189 When it did either, the
Court was responding to the substance of the state court’s decision.
In the early twentieth century, the Court decided three cases
involving the Guarantee Clause that illustrate the two options provided
by its doctrine and the substantive grounds of even a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction. The first, Pacific States Telephone, originated in the
Oregon courts, where Oregon prevailed on the merits. The case then
came to the Supreme Court of the United States via writ of error.190
As discussed above, the Court relied on Luther for the proposition
that Congress’s recognition of Oregon as a state, with the implication

187. Throughout the Court’s history, its appellate jurisdiction over the state courts
but not the federal courts has depended on the lower court’s resolution of a federal
question. See Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections
on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1045, 1048
(1977) (discussing the history and development of the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, in particular the expansion of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
due to the “enormous growth of federal enactments and judicial extrapolation of the
constitutional restraints upon state action”). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012) (giving
the Court certiorari jurisdiction over all decisions by the federal courts of appeals),
with 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012) (giving the Court certiorari jurisdiction only over state
court decisions that turn on a federal question).
188. See Francis J. Ulman & Frank H. Spears, Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal
Question, 20 B.U. L. REV. 501, 513–16 (1940) (describing development of the doctrine).
189. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1902). Like all
three of the political question cases discussed in this Section, Equitable Life Assurance
Society was written by Justice, later Chief Justice, Edward Douglass White.
190. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 136–37 (1912).
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that its government was republican, was binding on the courts.191 The
opinion concludes that because the issues are political “and not,
therefore, within the reach of judicial power, it follows that the case
presented is not within our jurisdiction, and the writ of error must
therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”192
By itself, Chief Justice White’s statement is ambiguous. The Court
might have lacked jurisdiction under Article III. The other possibility
is that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the case presented no
substantial federal question under the jurisdictional statutes. Chief
Justice White’s earlier characterization of Luther as the “leading and
absolutely controlling case” indicates that Pacific States Telephone rested on
statutory grounds. That characterization indicated that the outcome was
clear, and when the outcome was clear a case presented no substantial
federal question for purposes of the statute.193 The same implication
that the case presented no substantial federal question under the
statute appears in his explanation that a text-based argument against
the company’s contentions was not even necessary “since the repugnancy
of those contentions to the letter and spirit of that text is so conclusively
established by prior decisions of this court as to cause the matter to be
absolutely foreclosed.”194 In other contexts the modifiers “conclusively”
and “absolutely” might be just rhetoric, but in appeals from state courts
like Pacific States Telephone they bore on the Court’s jurisdiction. When
a state court decides a federal question in accordance with principles
conclusively established by an absolutely controlling Supreme Court
precedent that absolutely forecloses contrary argument, the case
presents no substantial federal question in the Court.
The case immediately following Pacific States Telephone in the United
States Reports also supports the conclusion that Chief Justice White
found no statutory jurisdiction in the prior case. Kiernan v. Portland195
involved a Guarantee Clause challenge to local level direct democracy
in Oregon. Having that day decided Pacific States Telephone, the Court
dismissed the writ of error in Kiernan because it presented no question
“sufficiently substantial to support the exertion of jurisdiction.”196
Kiernan’s reference to substantiality shows that the case was dismissed
for want of statutory jurisdiction.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 151.
Id. at 143, 146.
Id. at 142–43.
223 U.S. 151 (1912).
Id. at 164.
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Any remaining doubt whether Pacific States Telephone had been
dismissed under Article III was dispelled a few years later. Ohio ex rel.
Davis v. Hildebrant197 came to the Court from the Supreme Court of
Ohio. The Ohio Constitution provided for review of legislative acts
through referendum, and a statute redrawing the State’s congressional
districts had been disapproved via that process.198 Plaintiffs in the state
court sought an order directing Ohio election officials to disregard the
referendum on the grounds that the power over congressional elections
vested in state legislatures by Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution could
not be exercised via direct democracy.199 The Supreme Court of Ohio
rejected that argument, pointing out that the most recent act of
Congress governing congressional districting had been drafted so as to
refer to the legislative authority of the states, not just their
legislatures.200 The Ohio court did not discuss the Guarantee Clause.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed in an
opinion by Chief Justice White. The Chief Justice turned the plaintiffs’
argument under Article I into an argument under Article IV, because
the argument
must rest upon the assumption that to include the referendum in
the scope of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which
destroys that power, which in effect annihilates representative
government and causes a State where such condition exists to be not
republican in form in violation of the guarantee of the Constitution.201

That argument was “plainly without substance” because it disregarded
“the settled rule that the question of whether that guaranty of the
Constitution has been disregarded presents no justiciable controversy,
but involves the exercise by Congress of the authority vested in it by
the Constitution.”202 The absence of a justiciable controversy did not

197. 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
198. Id. at 566.
199. State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 114 N.E. 55, 56 (Ohio 1916), aff’d, 241 U.S. 565
(1916). Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
200. Hildebrant, 114 N.E. at 55; cf. Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257, 259 (1976) (per
curiam) (explaining that the Supreme Court of Ohio “speaks as a court only through
the syllabi of its cases,” not its opinions).
201. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 569 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4).
202. Id. (citing Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)).
Although Chief Justice White used the word “controversy,” which is found in Article
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deprive either the Supreme Courts of Ohio or the United States of
jurisdiction, and the Chief Justice made clear that his Court was
deciding the merits.
It is apparent from these reasons that there must either be a
dismissal for want of jurisdiction because there is no power to
reexamine the state questions foreclosed by the decision below and
because of the want of merit in the Federal questions relied upon,
or a judgment of affirmance, it being absolutely indifferent as to the
result which of the two be applied.203

Because of “the subject-matter of the controversy and the Federal
characteristics which inhere in it,” the Court decided to affirm rather
than dismiss.204 It thereby decided the case on the merits.
For the White Court the political question doctrine was not a
jurisdictional limitation. It was a principle of federal law that governed
decisions on the merits in both state and federal court. As such, it
could be so clearly correctly applied by a state court that the Supreme
Court of the United States could either dismiss an appeal or affirm.
d. Justiciability
Although the Supreme Court has not provided a canonical account
of justiciability, its use of the terminology and the pattern of results just
described yield a reasonably coherent understanding. A question or
issue is nonjusticiable when its resolution is confided to a political actor
whose conclusion will be absolutely binding on the courts. A claim is
nonjusticiable when the relationship between political and judicial
power means that no relief can be granted on it, and a case with no
justiciable claim is not justiciable. Justiciability is distinct from subject
matter jurisdiction in that a court can have jurisdiction to decide a case
that turns on nonjusticiability, and indeed a court can award relief in
a case in which an issue is nonjusticiable. When a plaintiff with a
meritorious claim relies on the political branches’ recognition of a
foreign government, for example, the political question doctrine
underlies part of the court’s reasoning in a successful suit.

III, he likely meant a dispute in a general sense rather than a lawsuit. Hildebrant was
in his Court as one of the “cases” arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States to which the Constitution extends the federal courts’ jurisdiction, not one of
the “controversies” listed in Article III. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending judicial
power to enumerated cases and controversies).
203. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 570.
204. Id.
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The difference between jurisdiction and justiciability explains why
the political question doctrine generally applies in state court. When
some source of federal law assigns final decisional authority to a
political actor, the state courts must respect that federal rule just as
much as the federal courts must. State courts may not interfere with
the political discretion of federal political actors. State courts are not,
however, subject to the jurisdictional limits of Article III.205 In general
they must implement the political question doctrine created by federal
law, as they must implement other principles of federal law that are not
confined to federal institutions the way Article III is.
2. Baker v. Carr, Jurisdiction, and Finality
Contrary to common impression, Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker
classifies the political question doctrine as one of non-judicial finality,
not as a limitation on Article III or statutory jurisdiction. Baker treated
subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability as distinct questions.206
The Court thus recognized that the political question doctrine could
govern cases within the courts’ jurisdiction, as had happened in Luther,
Coleman, and Hildebrant.
The Court in Baker explicitly distinguished between subject matter
jurisdiction and justiciability. A careful reading of the opinion, and in
particular the now much-quoted paragraph that lists six characteristics
of prior political question cases, shows that the Court regarded that
doctrine as producing non-judicial finality as to some legal
questions.207 An examination of the cases that Justice Brennan had
205.
We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to
state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations
of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they
address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the
Constitution or, in this case, a federal statute.
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (citations omitted). The ASARCO
Court had no occasion to consider whether any federal non-jurisdictional principles
of justiciability might apply in state court.
206. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196 (1962) (concluding that the district court
dismissed because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiffs did not state
a justiciable cause of action). The Court then discussed subject matter jurisdiction,
standing, and justiciability under separate headings. Id. at 198, 204, 208.
207.
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question,
although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a
function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case
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reviewed earlier in the opinion, cases that form the basis of that
paragraph, shows that all six characteristics were indicators that a
political actor had the last word in the application of law to fact. Justice
Brennan undertook to distinguish all of those cases from Baker itself,
so he had no occasion to state general principles governing the political
question doctrine.208 Although he did not offer a comprehensive account
of the doctrine, he treated political questions as issues on which a nonjudicial federal decision maker was final, and he did not present the
doctrine as a limit on the Article III jurisdiction.209
The Court’s review of earlier cases begins by formulating the
question as one of finality. “We have said that ‘In determining whether
a question falls within [the political question] category, the
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality
to the action of the political departments and also the lack of
satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant
considerations.’”210
When the Court decided Baker, its most recent political question
decision outside of the apportionment context was Coleman v. Miller.
Justice Brennan’s language in Baker strongly suggests that Coleman
provided a template for the first two features his opinion listed.211
In Coleman v. Miller . . . this Court held that the questions of how long
a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution remained open

held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
208. “Since that review [of earlier cases] is undertaken solely to demonstrate that
neither singly nor collectively do these cases support a conclusion that this
apportionment case is nonjusticiable, we of course do not explore their implications
in other contexts.” Id. at 210.
209. Justice Brennan discussed the Court’s earlier political question cases in order
to distinguish them from Baker. A doctrine of non-judicial finality for federal political
actors would not bar a suit like Baker, so the account that Justice Brennan gave of the
earlier cases was very much in keeping with his conclusion in the case before the Court.
210. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939)).
211. Id. at 217.
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to ratification, and what effect a prior rejection had on a subsequent
ratification, were committed to congressional resolution and involved
criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.212

Indeed, the word “commitment” may have come directly from Justice
Black’s opinion in Coleman.213 Chief Justice Hughes in that case also
stressed the difficulties for courts of the questions Congress would be
called on to address in deciding on timeliness in enacting
constitutional amendments.214 That concern is echoed in the second
consideration on Justice Brennan’s list.215
Similar textual evidence points to Luther, which was decided on the
merits pursuant to a political decision, as another source for the first
two features listed in Baker.
Clearly, several factors were thought by the Court in Luther to make
the question there “political”: the commitment to the other
branches of the decision as to which is the lawful state government;
the unambiguous action by the President, in recognizing the charter
government as the lawful authority; the need for finality in the
executive’s decision; and the lack of criteria by which a court could
determine which form of government was republican.216

In the next paragraph, Justice Brennan again indicated that Luther
turned in part on the second feature on his list. “But the only
significance that Luther could have for our immediate purposes is in its
holding that the Guaranty Clause is not a repository of judicially
manageable standards which a court could utilize independently in

212. Id. at 214 (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan’s reference to Coleman indicates
that he had identified the common ground of the seven Justices in the majority on the
political question issue, no five of whom joined an opinion.
213. “And decision of a ‘political question’ by the ‘political department’ to which
the Constitution has committed it ‘conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other
officers, citizens and subjects of . . . government.’” Coleman, 307 U.S. at 457 (Black, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212
(1890)). Three of the Justices who joined that opinion—Black, Douglas, and
Frankfurter—were on the Baker Court.
214.
Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination? None
are to be found in Constitution or statute . . . . In short, the question of a
reasonable time in many cases would involve, as in this case it does involve, an
appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social[,] and
economic, which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of
evidence receivable in a court of justice.
Id. at 453.
215. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
216. Id. at 222 (footnote omitted).
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order to identify a State’s lawful government.”217 On Justice Brennan’s
reading of prior cases, a textual commitment to a political actor and a
lack of standards appropriate to independent judicial decision were
prominent on the surface of the Court’s two great political question
precedents. Both of those cases turned on non-judicial finality. In
neither case did the Court deny jurisdiction under Article III.
Non-judicial finality resolves what is otherwise a baffling problem
concerning the first characteristic Justice Brennan listed, textual
commitment to another branch of government.218 All of Congress’s
powers are committed to it by the text, yet most exercises of those
powers do not give rise to political questions. Courts decide for
themselves whether federal statutes are constitutional. In the context of
quasi-adjudicatory decisions by actors other than courts, however, the
textual commitment referred to is one of quasi-adjudicatory authority,
not ordinary legislative or executive power. That is the context Justice
Brennan set by referring to finality in a political branch, and the context
in which he discussed the Court’s prior political question cases.
The prior decisions Justice Brennan discussed also illuminate the
third characteristic of those cases to which he drew attention, “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”219 The cases alluded to with that phrase
turned on non-judicial finality. Under the heading of “Foreign
Relations,” Justice Brennan had explained that questions in that realm
“frequently . . . involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably
committed to the executive or legislature.”220 In the accompanying
footnote, he cited a case from the 19th century, Doe v. Braden.221
In Doe v. Braden, one party in a Florida land dispute asked the court
to find that the King of Spain had not had the authority to cancel prior
land grants, which the King had purported to do in the treaty ceding
Florida to the United States.222 Chief Justice Taney concluded that the
question of the King’s power was political and not judicial.223 That
question had been conclusively resolved when the United States
entered into the treaty, which was accompanied by declarations of both

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 223.
See id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 211.
57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1854).
Id. at 654.
Id. at 657.
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parties that the King had annulled prior grants.224 The discretionary
decision was whether to make the treaty. The legal questions involved
public rights: the power of the King of Spain to act through a treaty,
and the resulting sovereign and proprietary interests of the United
States. The treaty, an act of the United States as a sovereign operating
with respect to other sovereigns, bound U.S. courts as to the legal
assumptions on which it rested.
Braden is an example of non-judicial finality and not lack of
jurisdiction. The Court in Braden did not deny its authority to decide,
or that of the trial court. Rather, it affirmed on the merits a judgment
that rested on the assumption that the treaty accomplished what the
United States and Spain said it accomplished. The King’s power to
cancel certain land grants was used as a premise for decision, not as a
bar thereto.225
224.
It was for the President and Senate to determine whether the king, by the
constitution and laws of Spain, was authorized to make this stipulation and to
ratify a treaty containing it. They have recognized his power by accepting this
stipulation as a part of the compact, and ratifying the treaty which contains it.
The constituted and legitimate authority of the United States, therefore, has
acquired and received this land as public property.
Id. at 657–58.
225. The second case cited as an example of policy discretion demonstrably
committed to another branch also involved a treaty, along with a later statute that
affected its operation. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (Curtis, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.
Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (deferring to executive and legislative branches on the
question whether a foreign sovereign has violated a treaty), aff’d, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481
(1862). The plaintiff, an importer of Russian hemp, claimed that a lower tariff rate
for hemp imported from India was inconsistent with a treaty giving Russian imports
most-favored-nation status. Id. at 784–85.
Justice Curtis, anticipating the Court’s decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889), maintained that a later-enacted
statute would override a treaty if they conflicted. Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 785. He was not,
however, willing to conclude that the later statute with the lower tariff violated the
treaty.
Is it a judicial question, whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign has been
violated by him; whether the consideration of a particular stipulation in a
treaty, has been voluntarily withdrawn by one party, so that it is no longer
obligatory on the other; whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign,
manifested through his representative have given just occasion to the political
departments of our government to withhold the execution of a promise
contained in a treaty, or to act in direct contravention of such a promise? I
apprehend not.
Id. at 787. Because those questions were confided to Congress, it was “immaterial” to
the court whether the statute violated the treaty. If it did not, “the plaintiff [had] no
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The fourth characteristic that indicates a political question, “the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,”226
also very likely derived from a case that rested on non-judicial finality,
Field v. Clark. That case treated congressional certification of an enrolled
bill as conclusive. After discussing Coleman and the enactment of
constitutional amendments, Justice Brennan in Baker said,
Similar considerations apply to the enacting process [for statutes]:
“The respect due to coequal and independent departments,” and
the need for finality and certainty about the status of a statute
contribute to judicial reluctance to inquire whether, as passed, it
complied with all requisite formalities.227

Once again, Justice Brennan probably drew his phraseology, here the
word “respect,” from the earlier case. Having concluded that the bill as
enacted was the authoritative text, the Court decided Field on the merits.
The fifth characteristic Justice Brennan canvassed, “an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,”228
was also a ground of non-judicial finality, not lack of jurisdiction.
Earlier in Baker, Justice Brennan had discussed “this Court’s refusal to

case.” Id. If it did, Congress’s act was “the municipal law of the country,” and
complaints should be addressed to the political branches, not the courts. Id.
Justice Brennan in Baker cited Taylor without elaboration, 369 U.S. 186, 211
n.32 (1962), leaving to inference how Taylor involved standards that defy judicial
application or the exercise of discretion demonstrably committed to a political branch.
On the latter point, Congress demonstrably has the power to pass legislation that
reflects the state of U.S. foreign relations, for example its relations with Russia
concerning tariffs. On the former point, the question whether one party to a treaty
has breached it, or has decided not to insist on it, could be very difficult for a court to
resolve. Not only is international law often vague, but courts do not have the
information about foreign relations necessary to answer such questions. One party to
a treaty might quietly agree to allow the other to act in a way inconsistent with it,
perhaps in return for some seemingly unrelated concession on another issue.
Whether Russia had breached the treaty, or whether a seemingly inconsistent U.S.
tariff was nevertheless consistent with this country’s obligations under the treaty, was
by itself a question of law. Relations between nations, like relations between
individuals, are not only about legal rights. Whether to assert a legal position is a
question of policy, not law, and nations, like individuals, may have rights that they do
not wish to assert. If the United States acts on the assumption that a treaty permits
some action, like adopting a tariff rate, it decides both law and policy: what is this
country entitled to, and what is it prepared to assert it is entitled to?
226. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
227. Id. at 214 (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676–77
(1892)).
228. Id. at 217.
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review the political departments’ determination of when or whether a
war has ended. Dominant is the need for finality in the political
determination, for emergency’s nature demands ‘A prompt and
unhesitating obedience.’”229
The “prompt and unhesitating
obedience” at issue in Martin v. Mott,230 the case Justice Brennan relied
on, was a militia member’s obligation to report for duty at the
President’s call. Whether that call really was in response to the
exigencies set out in the militia statute was up to the President, whose
decision was not to be questioned elsewhere.
Is the President the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency
has arisen, or is it to be considered as an open question, upon which
every officer to whom the orders of the President are addressed, may
decide for himself, and equally open to be contested by every militiaman who shall refuse to obey the orders of the President?231

In Martin, the Court relied on the political question principle to supply
a premise on which to decide the merits. Mott sued Martin, and
Martin’s defense relied on the court martial’s judgment, which in turn
relied on the President’s order, which rested on the President’s
determination. The Court did not suggest that there was any lack of
jurisdiction in the court martial, in the New York court in which Mott
first sued, or on writ of error to it from the highest court of New York.
Justice Brennan’s recognition that all those tribunals had jurisdiction
shows that his fifth characteristic was about non-judicial finality, not
lack of jurisdiction.
For Justice Brennan, prior cases sought to avoid “embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question”232 by giving conclusive effect to prior political-branch
decisions. The sixth characteristic he listed was also a marker of nonjudicial finality.
Often the political branches act without a
pronouncement on anything, but they frequently make such
pronouncements when they have to apply a legal standard to some
factual situation. Before summarizing the earlier political question
cases, Baker had explained that many questions involving foreign
relations “uniquely demand single-voiced statement[s] of the
229. Id. at 213 (quoting Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827)).
230. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
231. Id. at 29–30. Martin was a collateral challenge to Mott’s conviction by a court
martial for failing to report. Martin was a deputy marshal who had seized Mott’s
property to carry out a fine imposed by the court martial whom Mott sued for replevin.
Id. at 28.
232. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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Government’s views.”233 Pointing to the need for “single-voiced
statement[s] of the Government’s views” emphasizes that the Court
was talking about statements of position, not all actions that may rest
on a position.
Perhaps most important for understanding that reference to a single
voice in international relations, and the later-listed characteristic that
alludes to it, is the case cited in a footnote, once again Doe v. Braden.
The U.S. Government’s view on the validity of the Spanish land grant
in dispute, expressed in its declaration and the President’s ratification
of a treaty with Spain’s declaration, was indeed a pronouncement.
Moreover, it was a pronouncement on behalf of the United States as a
sovereign acting with respect to other sovereigns, to whom the internal
structure of the U.S. government is of no concern. For another
component of that government later to undercut that assertion would
not be consistent with the Constitution’s structure governing foreign
relations, in which the complexities of American separation of powers
and federalism are largely kept out of the view of external sovereigns.234
Having found the Executive’s statement about the land grant
conclusive, the Court went on to decide Braden on the merits.
Justice Brennan in Baker formulated the political question principle
as one of non-judicial finality, discussed prior cases turning on nonjudicial finality, and then summarized those cases in his well-known
paragraph. Read in light of the rest of the opinion, that paragraph
treats the political question doctrine as a principle of conclusive
application of law to fact by political decision makers. In the decades
after Baker, the Court has only once relied on that precedent in finding
that the political question doctrine controlled a case. It did so in Nixon
v. United States and treated the Senate’s conviction of Judge Nixon as
conclusive and not subject to judicial review. The Court has never held
that the political question doctrine is a limit on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. To do so would be a departure from, not an application
of, Baker v. Carr.

233. Id. at 211.
234. “Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must ‘“speak . . . with one voice.’
That voice must be the President’s.” Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Am. Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424
(2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000)). Zivotofsky
concerned a clash between Congress and the President; Garamendi and Crosby
concerned clashes between federal and state policy. In all three cases, a single actor
spoke for the United States despite this country’s complex constitutional structure of
federalism and separation of powers.
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C. Political Questions, Political Power, and Judicial Power
This Section identifies the principles that explain the Court’s results
and the derivation of those principles from the constitutional
separation of political and judicial power.
The two branches of the political question doctrine have a common
theme. In each of them, the distinction between judicial and political
power poses a problem because one component of the government is
called on to perform a function more associated with the other. Nonjudicial finality arises only when a political decision maker is called on
to apply law to a particular set of facts. Although political actors
sometimes perform that function, it is quintessentially the role of the
courts. The political question doctrine identifies some of the situations
in which the non-judicial decision is binding on the judiciary.235
The doctrine’s limits on the judiciary’s authority to give prospective
relief arise only when the courts are called on to go beyond requiring
compliance with the law and require or forbid some conduct that is
itself legally indifferent. The plaintiffs in Gilligan did not argue that
the law permitted only one choice of weapons or tactics for the Ohio
National Guard in dealing with riots. Rather, they asked the court to
choose among the legally permissible options in order to prevent
unnecessary harm to civilians. In devising relief of that kind, courts make
the type of policy decisions normally entrusted to political actors.236
When the political question doctrine produces non-judicial finality,
it enables a political actor to do what courts normally do. When the
doctrine limits judicial remedies that control discretion, it keeps courts

235. Non-judicial finality is sometimes created by the Constitution, sometimes by
sub-constitutional law. The impeachment provisions of their own force make the
Senate’s decisions conclusive on the courts. The enrolled bill doctrine, by contrast, is
likely subject to change by legislation. With respect to non-judicial finality, therefore,
the political question doctrine answers two distinct but closely related questions:
whether the Constitution makes a political actor final, and whether sub-constitutional
law may make a political actor final. The doctrine considers these questions together
because the answers rest on the same considerations concerning the difference
between political and judicial power.
236. In a wrongful death action, by contrast, the court asks whether a particular use
of deadly force was reasonable, not whether the defendant had been properly trained.
A Guardsman who receives proper training, carries an appropriate weapon, is subject
to well-conceived doctrine, and panics and kills someone without reason, has acted
unlawfully and will be accountable in a tort action. Prospective remedies like
injunctions differ fundamentally from retrospective remedies like damages because
damages are assessed after decisions are made, and need not be based on guesses
about what will happen in the future.
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from reaching into the political sphere. In both contexts, the doctrine
draws the line between political and judicial power in cases in which
that line’s location is subject to doubt, because the powers in some
sense overlap one another. It draws the line in favor of a political
decision maker, rather than the courts.
The Court’s rationale for non-judicial finality can be seen in three
leading cases: Luther, Coleman, and Nixon v. United States. Each of them
has two features that explain why the courts would treat a non-judicial
decision as final. Chief Justice Taney made the first feature plain in
Luther: the identity of a State’s legitimate government has very
important consequences for a great many people. As he explained, if
the Charter government of Rhode Island had been unlawful, then it
illegally collected taxes and used force with no legal justification.237 In
similar fashion, the content of the Constitution’s text has
consequences of the highest importance for everyone in the country.
In impeachment cases, the widespread consequences of a single legal
decision flow from identifying officers who may lawfully exercise
power. Whether one President has been removed and replaced with
someone else is a momentous question for the entire country. In each
of those cases, the application of a legal rule to one particular set of
facts affects the public at large in a fundamental way.
The second feature shared by those three leading cases concerns the
legal standards involved. In all of them, the applicable legal rule
involved highly delicate normative questions that the rules themselves
did not explicitly resolve. Whether a purported state government is
lawful is one of political legitimacy. In Chief Justice Hughes’s view in
Coleman, the timeliness of a constitutional amendment depended on
the nation’s continuing need for change, which in turn depended on
many political, economic, and social factors.238 Those are judgments
about the public interest on a very broad scale. In an impeachment
trial, the Senate must decide whether the impeached officer has
engaged in culpable official conduct that makes that person unfit to
exercise power.239

237. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38–39 (1849).
238. See supra note 214.
239. Discussing the Senate as a court of impeachment, Alexander Hamilton, writing
under his pen name “Publius,” wrote,
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of
some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be
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The other branch of the doctrine, relied on in Gilligan, also rests on
those two rationales, with the second being especially prominent. That
aspect of the doctrine limits judicial intrusion into political discretion,
and operates where that discretion is at its height: with respect to
military and national security matters. Gilligan itself provides an
instructive example. In planning for riots, or dealing with a riot,
political decision makers face questions of life and death. They must
assess and weigh risks concerning the deaths rioters may cause and the
deaths the military may cause in putting down a riot. Just as too much
force can needlessly kill those against whom it is directed, too little
force, or force badly deployed, can let violence continue when it could
have been contained.
Slightly below the surface in Gilligan is the other consideration
found in the non-judicial finality cases. As riot control exemplifies,
military decisions regularly affect a large number of people in much
the same way. The Ohio National Guard’s riot planning affected all
potential participants in and victims of rioting, and when implemented
that policy would apply to hundreds or thousands of people at once.
Together, those two features can make a strong case for judicial
deference to political decisions that normally would be reviewed by the
courts, and for judicial non-interference with discretion. When a
single legal judgment affects many people, having one voice speak first
and conclusively is of great value. Luther makes this point. To comply
with the law, people need to know who the law-givers and other
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately
to the society itself.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 338 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James
McClellan, eds., 2001); cf. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 37
(1974) (arguing that impeachable offenses, like treason and bribery, “are offenses
(1) which are extremely serious, (2) which in some way corrupt or subvert the political
and governmental process, and (3) which are plainly wrong in themselves to a person
of honor, or to a good citizen, regardless of words on the statute book”). All three
criteria call for normative judgment and the second and third call for judgments about
the public interest and the obligations of citizenship.
Another aspect of the applicable legal rule may also matter, though it does not
appear in the Court’s most prominent cases. As the Court stressed in Field, the rules
for adoption of statutes apply to facts that arise in the legislative process.
Congressional officers who certify passage of a bill judge their own conduct and that
of the houses for which they act. Those rules introduce another source of delicacy in
their application: because legislative officers are called on to report on their own
actions, to say that they have reported incorrectly is close to saying that they are not
just mistaken, but lying. That led the Court in Field to invoke the respect due to
coordinate branches and the Court in Baker to echo that sentiment.
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government officials are. If private people cannot tell which
individuals really are government officials, their uncertainty will
undermine many important activities, like paying taxes and making
contracts. Professor Charles Black emphasized the same factor with
respect to presidential impeachment.240 Wondering whether a
President who had been convicted by the Senate had actually been
removed could plunge the country into chaos. The sooner a
conclusive answer is available, the less damage that doubt will cause.
Under those circumstances, the ordinary arrangement in which
legislatures and executives act, subject to judicial review at some
indefinite time in the future, can turn uncertainty into paralysis.
Second, some legal norms lend themselves to application by
politically knowledgeable and accountable decision makers. When the
Federal Convention chose the Senate and not the ordinary courts for
the trial of impeachments, it put the question whether the Chief
Executive and other officers could be trusted with the people’s power
in the hands of the people’s representatives. Those representatives
would be familiar with the judgments that must be made in matters of
state. Judges are selected for technical expertise in law not for their
ability to decide how to deal with riots, or whether a state government
satisfies basic principles of political morality of the American republic.
Those practical arguments align with the concepts of judicial and
political power. The quintessential role of the courts is the neutral
application of law to specific facts that involve specific parties.
Balancing competing considerations involving large numbers of
people, and deciding for themselves what is right and wrong, are tasks
for the politically accountable. The larger the number of parties
affected, and the more value-laden the legal standards involved, the
more any particular decision smacks of political and not judicial power.
Underlying the political question doctrine is thus a paradigm of the
judicial role.241 The Court’s cases reflect the conclusion that in some

240. Black described the scenario in which a President is removed by the Senate
and then reinstated by the Court, possibly by a 5-4 vote, and said, “I don’t think I
possess the resources of rhetoric adequate to characterize the absurdity of that
position.” BLACK, supra note 239, at 54.
241. Luther invokes another feature of the judicial power that arises from the fact
that courts decide cases about particular parties: different adjudications can resolve
the same factual issue differently. As Chief Justice Taney explained, the plaintiffs in
Luther raised questions of fact that were proper for a jury. Different juries, however,
might resolve the factual dispute differently, with one concluding that the charter
government had stayed in power and another that it had been replaced with the Dorr
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situations where judges would be taken far out of the role, the
applicable legal rules assign authority elsewhere. The Constitution
makes, or permits, that assignment because the idea of judicial power
permits or even requires it.242
The political question doctrine does not rest on limits on the federal
courts’ authority to decide cases. It does reflect an attempt to integrate
that authority with the functions of the political branches, especially
those functions that very much resemble adjudication.
II. POLITICAL RIGHTS, STANDING, AND WHAT THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE ONCE WAS
Two Reconstruction cases, Mississippi v. Johnson and Georgia v.
Stanton, are frequently classified as political question decisions. As I
explained above, the Court’s rationale in Mississippi v. Johnson puts it
in the same category as Gilligan, in which the autonomy of the political
branches limits the orders the courts may lawfully give them.243 Georgia
v. Stanton, which reached a similar result but on different grounds,
would today be classified as a standing case. It might also still be called
a political question case in that the State of Georgia lacked standing
because the interest it sought to assert was wholly political.244

constitution. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 41–42 (1849). Political decision makers can
provide uniformity of decision when courts may not be able to.
242. The legal rule that creates non-judicial finality need not itself come from the
Constitution. Four categories are possible, and each one probably is occupied. First,
in some circumstances non-judicial finality is constitutionally mandatory. For example, it
is unlikely that Congress could, by statute, give any court appellate jurisdiction over
the Senate as a court of impeachment, or even relax the preclusive effect of a judgment
of conviction as to removal from office. Second, there are some situations in which
Congress may provide for absolute non-judicial finality but need not do so. Whether
a statute was properly enacted is probably such a question. Third, as to some issues
Congress may provide for partial finality in a non-judicial decision maker. The bulk
of agency adjudication, which is subject to judicial review in an appellate form, falls
into this category. Finally, as to some issues, or perhaps with respect to some interests,
only a court (including a jury) may have any conclusive authority.
243. Whether Mississippi v. Johnson would be decided today on the same rationale is not
clear. Certainly, the Court would not accept the broad proposition that executive officers
may not be enjoined from executing statutes, nor does the old distinction between
discretionary and ministerial duties have the force it had in the nineteenth century.
244. A leading theme of this Article is that the political question doctrine as the
Court now expounds it is not a limit on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The constitutional standing doctrine is such a limit, and it makes sense as such
because it concerns the plaintiff’s interest, which is the subject matter of a lawsuit.
Insofar as Georgia v. Stanton would today be classified as a political question case, the
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Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Article III courts may
adjudicate only cases in which the plaintiff has standing. By that the
Court means not only that some source of law must authorize the
plaintiff to sue, but also that the legal rules that do so must meet certain
criteria. Those rules may enable suits by a private plaintiff only if the
plaintiff has suffered or is threatened with an injury in fact, a category
that does not include all harms that might be defined as actionable by
sub-constitutional law.245 It is clear that one particular interest does
not count: a citizen’s interest that the law be complied with, either by
the government or another private person.246
After the Supreme Court dismissed the bill in Mississippi v. Johnson,
another former Confederate state sought relief from the
Reconstruction Acts of 1867 in the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction. In Georgia v. Stanton, Georgia had a slightly different
theory. The state sought to persuade the Court that property rights
were at stake, and not just the political rights of sovereignty.247 At
political question doctrine includes a limit on subject matter jurisdiction, but only
because it overlaps with the Article III standing limitation.
245. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). A plaintiff must first
suffer an “‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’” Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)). The second
element requires “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of,” which means that the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the
defendant’s challenged action. Id. at 560 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). “Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id. at 561
(citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
246.
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.
Id. at 573–74.
247.
The bill [that Georgia asked leave to file] in setting forth the political rights
of the State of Georgia, and of its people sought to be protected, averred
among other things, that the State was owner of certain real estate and
buildings therein . . . exceeding in value $5,000,000; and that putting the acts
of Congress into execution and destroying the State would deprive it of the
possession and enjoyment of its property. This reference [to the State’s
property was] not set up, however, as a specific or independent ground of
relief.
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argument, counsel for Georgia maintained that “the great objection,
of the other side . . . that the subject-matter of this bill, the case stated,
and the relief sought, are political in their nature,—is without force.”248
The Court was not persuaded, concluding that it “possesse[d] no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter presented in the bill for relief.”249
That subject matter included both “political questions” and “rights, not
of persons or property, but of a political character . . . . For the rights
for the protection of which our jurisdiction is invoked, are the rights
of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate
existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges.”250
Courts protect a different kind of interest. “No case of private rights
or private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened
infringement, is presented by the bill, in a judicial form, for the
judgment of the court.”251
In both Mississippi v. Johnson and Georgia v. Stanton, the Court
appears to have concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit, where by the subject matter it meant the interests
the plaintiffs presented for adjudication; those interests were political,
and hence not the kind of legal rights that courts protect. In similar
fashion, the Court today regards standing as a limitation on the federal
courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Care must be taken in interpreting
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 53 (1868).
248. Id. at 67.
249. Id. at 77. That conclusion meant that the Court did not have to consider the
defendants’ argument that under Luther it was bound to regard the plaintiff
government of Georgia as illegal, unrepublican, and provisional only, on the grounds
that Congress had determined it to be so in one of the Reconstruction Acts.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 74 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15, 20 (1831)).
Writing for the Court in Georgia v. Stanton, Justice Nelson relied on a dictum of Chief
Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation. In the earlier case, the Cherokee Nation had sought an
injunction in the Court’s original jurisdiction against the implementation of Georgia
legislation that, said Justice Nelson, “if permitted to be carried into execution, would
have subverted the tribal government of the Indians; and subjected them to the jurisdiction
of the State.” Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 74. The Court in Cherokee Nation
found that the Cherokee Nation was not a state for purposes of the original
jurisdiction. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. Justice Nelson said in Georgia v. Stanton that
Marshall’s majority “intimated that the bill [in equity in the original jurisdiction] was
untenable on another ground, namely, that it involved simply a political question.”
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 74 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (7 Pet.) at
20). Marshall was concerned that the request “to control the Legislature of Georgia, and
to restrain the exertion of its physical force . . . savours too much of the exercise of political
power to be within the proper province of the judicial department.” Id. Marshall’s
reasoning in Cherokee Nation closely resembles the Court’s in Mississippi v. Johnson.

512

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:457

statements about jurisdiction, not all of which really concern the
fundamentals of judicial power. The interest of the plaintiff, however,
does go to those fundamentals. If there are interests that are
categorically excluded from the judicial purview, then a plaintiff
seeking the vindication of only such interests brings to court a matter
with which the courts are not concerned. When political rights fall
into that excluded category, the Article III courts have no authority to
give relief to protect them, whether that conclusion is explained under
the rubric of standing or political rights or questions.
It is hard to say how the Court today would apply its standing
doctrine to the kind of sovereign interest asserted in Georgia v. Stanton.
The main rationale for contemporary standing doctrine would not bar
such a suit. That rationale is that litigation concerning interests that
are widely or universally shared, like the people’s interest in
compliance with the law, should be controlled by politically
accountable officers, not by self-appointed private litigants.252 When a
state sues through its political officers, that requirement is met. Quite
possibly the current Court would think that a case like Georgia v. Stanton
presents problems concerning the remedy, not the interest at stake.
Whatever the status of rights of sovereignty may be today, one
political interest definitely can support adjudication in Article III
courts: the right to vote.253 The category of interests that Article III
courts do not protect may be different today from the 1860s, but the
contemporary standing cases show that the category still exists.
III. THE LOWER COURTS’ JURISDICTIONAL
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
In the last few decades a substantial number of lower court decisions
have seriously misunderstood the Supreme Court’s political question
doctrine. Several of the courts of appeals have decided cases that have
the following characteristics: (1) the case was dismissed under the
political question doctrine for want of jurisdiction; (2) the plaintiff was
a private person seeking relief on the basis of principles of liability that
252. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983). In then-Judge Scalia’s view, the interests of
the public at large—majorities as he puts it—should be protected by political actors,
while the courts protect the rights of minorities who face distinct and particularized
harm. Id. at 894–95.
253. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free
of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured
by the Constitution . . . .”).
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apply between private persons; (3) the court found that granting the
plaintiff relief would in some way be inconsistent with a policy decision
concerning national security or foreign relations ostensibly made on
behalf of the United States; (4) the plaintiff did not seek mandatory
relief against the United States or one of its officials that would direct
the performance of official functions; and (5) the court did not find
that it was bound to treat as conclusive the application of law to fact by
a political actor.254
None of those decisions has any foundation in the political question
doctrine as the Supreme Court has applied it, nor did any of those
cases fall outside the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction as
constrained by Article III for the reason the court gave. The version of
the political question doctrine the lower courts have developed in
those cases is unsound.255
This Section will first give a number of examples of lower court cases
that fit into the category just described. It will then explain how they
do not rest on the Supreme Court’s political question doctrine, nor on
any plausible understanding of the judicial power under Article III.

254. Many lower court political question cases do not meet that description and are
consistent with the Supreme Court’s doctrine as described in this article. A significant
number of cases do meet that description, and I think that any case that does is not a
correct application of the Supreme Court’s precedents. The description refers to
principles that govern liability between private parties, and not just to suits between
private parties, so as to include suits against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and other waivers of sovereign immunity that make the federal government
liable when a private defendant would be. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012)
(providing that the U.S. government is liable in tort when a private person would be).
I refer to liability, not damages, because the law that applies between private parties
might give rise to declaratory or injunctive relief, as under the Sherman Act. The
important point is not that damages were sought, but that the remedy was not of the
kind disapproved in Gilligan, a feature of the cases captured in the fourth part of the
description.
255. To say that the lower courts’ doctrine is in error is not to say that any particular
case was decided incorrectly. First, cases that follow applicable circuit precedent
cannot be faulted on the grounds that the precedent is incorrect. Second, courts
decide cases on the basis of the parties’ arguments, and often are under no obligation
to identify an argument no party has made. If all parties agree that the political
question doctrine is a constitutional limit on jurisdiction, a court may be allowed to
accept that conclusion. It is also hard to say whether a court of appeals decides
incorrectly when it follows a dictum from the Supreme Court that describes the Court’s
cases, when the dictum is itself inaccurate. As discussed above, the Court has said that
its political question cases rest on a limit on the Article III jurisdiction, but that is not
correct, and the Court has never relied on that principle as part of its reasoning in
deciding a case.
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A. Lower Court Political Question Cases
In recent years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
relied on the political question doctrine in deciding a number of cases
in which the plaintiff sought recovery from the personal funds of
current or former federal officials for actions connected with U.S.
foreign or national security affairs. A leading example is Schneider v.
Kissinger,256 brought against former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
concerning decisions he made while serving as National Security
Adviser to President Nixon. Plaintiffs were the two sons and the estate
of the late General Rene Schneider of Chile, who was killed in 1970.257
According to the plaintiffs, General Schneider was murdered by
members of Chile’s military with the encouragement of high U.S.
officials, including Kissinger.258 The plaintiffs maintained that
Kissinger was involved in arranging a military coup against Chilean
President Salvador Allende, and that the success of the coup depended
on eliminating General Schneider.259 The plaintiffs sought recovery
against Kissinger personally on a number of tort claims.260
The district court granted a motion to dismiss for want of subject
matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.261 Relying on
four of what it characterized as the six factors set out in Baker, the court
found that “this case raises political questions committed to the
political branches and therefore is beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts.”262 After Schneider, the D.C. Circuit dismissed on political
256. 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
257. Id. at 191.
258. Id. at 192.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 192–93. Pursuant to the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2012), the
Attorney General certified that Kissinger had been acting within the scope of his office
at the time of the events covered by the complaint and the United States was
substituted as the defendant. Schneider, 412 F.3d at 192–93. Substitution of the United
States under the Westfall Act is not an assertion of sovereign immunity, because
Congress has waived sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which
provides that, subject to certain exceptions, “the United States shall be liable . . . in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”
28 U.S.C. § 2674. Under the Westfall Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United
States was liable only if Secretary Kissinger would have been liable personally. The
court of appeals in Schneider thus treated that case as if it were still against Kissinger
personally for purposes of the political question doctrine.
261. Schneider, 412 F.3d at 191.
262. Id. at 198. The court found that the suit “raises policy questions that are
textually committed to a coordinate branch of government,” id. at 194, that there were
no judicially discoverable or manageable standards under which to resolve it because
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question grounds several more suits in which private parties sought
damages from U.S. government officials for events arising out of U.S.
intelligence activities.263
The D.C. Circuit has also dismissed on political question grounds a
claim for tort damages arising out of a U.S. military targeting decision.
El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States264 was brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover for the destruction of the
plaintiff’s pharmaceutical plant in Sudan by U.S. military action.
President Clinton explained in a radio address to the nation that the
plant was targeted because it was believed to be associated with terrorist
activities and used for the production of chemical weapons.265
Plaintiffs maintained that the facility was civilian property not
associated with terrorism and thus not a legitimate target under the
law of war.266 The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, found that “[i]f the
political question doctrine means anything in the arena of national
security and foreign relations, it means the courts cannot assess the
merits of the President’s decision to launch an attack on a foreign
target, and the plaintiffs ask us to do just that.”267
In recent years the courts of appeals have also dismissed on political
question grounds suits against members of the military, and private
military contractors, for alleged negligence in the conduct of military
plaintiffs’ tort claims did “not provide standards for making or reviewing foreign policy
judgments,” id. at 197, that “judicial resolution would require an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion” because “we would be
forced to pass judgment on the policy-based decision of the executive to use covert
action to prevent [the Allende] government from taking power,” id., and that the court
“could not determine Appellants’ claims without passing judgment on the decision of
the executive branch to participate in the alleged covert operations,” id. at 198.
263. Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006), like Schneider, arose
out of U.S. support for the coup against President Allende in Chile. Relying on
Schneider, the court of appeals found that the district court lacked jurisdiction because
the case presented a political question. Id. at 1264–65. In Bancoult v. McNamara, 445
F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2006), former residents of the island of Diego Garcia sued a
number of former executive officials in their personal capacities, and the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claiming that they had been illegally removed from
their homes. Id. at 429–30. Relying on Schneider, the court of appeals found that the
case presented a political question and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for want
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 437–38. Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), is another damages action involving U.S. foreign policy that was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction on political question grounds. Id. at 421.
264. 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
265. Id. at 838.
266. Id. at 838–40.
267. Id. at 844.
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operations. An example is Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services,
Inc.268 Carmichael was an action by Annette Carmichael, wife of
Sergeant Keith Carmichael, who had become disabled as a result of
injuries suffered while serving in Iraq. In May 2004, Sergeant
Carmichael was severely injured while riding in a truck operated by
Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) that was part of a military convoy
traveling an extremely dangerous route.269 Annette Carmichael sued
KBR in state court, alleging that the truck’s driver, a KBR employee,
had been negligent.270 KBR removed the case to the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia and moved to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction under the political question doctrine.271 The district court
granted the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed.272 Relying on two of the so-called Baker factors, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked jurisdiction
because the case presented a political question.273

268. 572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009).
269. Id. at 1275–76, 1278.
270. Id. at 1278–79.
271. Id. at 1279.
272. Id. The district court dismissed the case rather than remanding it to state
court. Section 1447(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, “If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012).
273. See Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1296 (holding that inquiring into the cause of the
accident would require the court to address matters assigned to other branches of
government, a political question over which the court lacked jurisdiction). Similar to
Carmichael is Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011), in
which the Fourth Circuit found a lack of jurisdiction on political question grounds
over a tort claim by a service member who had been severely injured, allegedly as a
result of negligence by KBR employees in connection with U.S. military operations in
Iraq. Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, 724 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1152 (2015), was a negligence claim by the parents and estate of a U.S.
service member who was electrocuted while taking a shower in Iraq. The district court
dismissed for want of jurisdiction on political question grounds. Id. at 463. The Third
Circuit found that a case against a private contractor could under certain
circumstances be dismissed for want of jurisdiction on political question grounds, id.
at 465–66, and discussed in depth the appropriate analysis under its reading of Baker
v. Carr, id. at 466–82, and the application of that analysis to different claims under
different possible sources of law. The court of appeals ultimately concluded that the
case depended on a choice of law question, which the district court had not resolved:
if Pennsylvania law applied, the case contained no nonjusticiable issue, but if
Tennessee or Texas law applied, some of the issues were nonjusticiable. The court of
appeals remanded the case so the district court could identify the applicable
substantive law and apply the court of appeals’s reasoning. Id. at 482.
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Another decision treating the political question doctrine as a
jurisdictional bar to claims of private liability is Spectrum Stores, Inc. v.
Citgo Petroleum Corp.274 The plaintiffs, who were gasoline retailers, sued
a number of petroleum production companies, some of which, like
Citgo, are wholly or partially state-owned.275 The plaintiffs claimed that
the defendants participated in conspiracies to fix prices and limit the
production of oil in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.276
Although no governments were sued, the pricing and production
decisions at issue were in large measure those of governments that are
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).277 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on political question grounds.278
Largely accepting the arguments in a Statement of Interest submitted
by the Department of Justice on behalf of several cabinet departments,
the Fifth Circuit found that “adjudication of this case would result in
the frustration of various objectives ‘of vital interest to the United
States’ national security.’”279 The court of appeals did not decide
whether the federal statutes on which plaintiffs relied entitled them to
relief against the defendants.280
B. The Lower Court Cases and the Supreme Court’s Doctrine
As I have explained, the Supreme Court’s political question doctrine
has two branches, neither of which limits subject matter jurisdiction.
The first, non-judicial finality, tells the courts how to decide cases, and
sometimes tells them to withhold relief in a case over which they have
jurisdiction. The second, limits on prospective remedies, similarly
instruct the courts to withhold relief in cases they are authorized to
decide.

274. 632 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 2011).
275. Id. at 942.
276. Id. at 944–45.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 948.
279. Id. at 951–52 (footnote omitted).
280. Id. at 956. In addition to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C., Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second and Ninth Circuits have also held that
the political question doctrine imposes limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts. See, e.g., Saldana v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 774 F.3d 544, 555
(9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of subject matter on political
question grounds); Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57, 73–74 (2d
Cir. 2005) (same).
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The lower court cases with which I am concerned do not fall into
either of those categories. This Section will elaborate on the difference
between the limited circumstances in which the political question
doctrine limits the courts and the much more common circumstances
in which the branches of government perform their ordinary
functions. In those more usual circumstances, courts apply law to fact
on their own, and while they may decide whether an official’s
discretionary act complied with the law, they do not themselves
exercise discretion.
Because they misunderstand Baker and the earlier cases it expounds,
the courts of appeals routinely fail to recognize that the political
question doctrine mainly turns on non-judicial finality. Instead of
looking for indicia that a political actor has been given authority to
apply law to fact conclusively, as Justice Brennan did in Baker, they
often find that the doctrine operates when the political branches have
their usual relationship to the law, in which they are not final as the
courts are. Many of the cases involve rules of liability that apply directly
to government decision makers and those acting at their direction. Of
course, the person who has a duty to comply with a legal rule is not in
the position of a court; potential tortfeasors do not conclusively decide
whether they have committed a tort. Unlike an adjudicator, a potential
tortfeasor need know nothing about the content of the law. Someone
who has never heard of negligence can take due care and so act
lawfully, and a military commander with a very limited knowledge of
the law of war can comply with it and so avoid personal liability. Being
held to a rule and being called on to determine whether it has been
violated are very different functions.281
Cases like Spectrum Stores involve executive officials who are charged with
applying legal rules to someone else, but whose decisions nevertheless are
not conclusive on that question the way that a court’s judgment is. The
executive branch enforces the antitrust laws, but when it brings a
prosecution under the Sherman Act the court decides for itself
whether the statute has been violated. Non-judicial finality is very
much the exception and not the rule, and when the political question
doctrine is properly understood it will rarely be found to be applicable.

281. A similar distinction applies with respect to Congress, although the legal
category involved is power and not duty. In voting on legislation, members of Congress
often make judgments about its constitutionality. While the courts may give some level
of deference to the legislature’s judgment, they are not absolutely bound thereby; if
they were, judicial review as known in this country would not exist.
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According to the Court, the political question rubric also applies
when mandatory judicial remedies would intrude into political
discretion. Again misled by the famous passage from Baker, the lower
courts have often failed to see the distinction the Court adumbrated in
Scheuer.282 Legal rules, including rules that impose personal liability on
executive officials, set the limits on official discretion. When officials
act within their discretion they have official privilege, but when they go
outside it they do not and may be liable (though they may also be
immune in close cases).283 Although the possibility of liability very
likely will affect official conduct—indeed, that is one of its functions—
when the courts decide on the limits of discretion they do not usurp it.
That is why the Court was untroubled by the possibility of ex post
personal liability for military decisions in Scheuer, and in a dictum in
Gilligan.284 The political question doctrine is implicated in cases like
the latter, in which courts are asked to give mandatory remedies that
go beyond enforcing rules that limit the Executive.
282. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1973) (suggesting that executive
officials do not have absolute personal immunity, but a qualified immunity from
liability when their acts are not clearly unlawful).
283. The relations between government officials and the legal rules that enable and
constrain them underlie so-called officer suits, in which private plaintiffs seek damages
from the personal funds of government officials for allegedly illegal conduct under
color of official authority. Officials like law enforcement officers and members of the
military involved in combat have privileges to inflict harm that ordinarily would be
unlawful. When they act beyond those privileges they are personally liable for harm
they inflict. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 390–92 (1971) (describing officer suit structure). An early case involving
the privileges of combatants to invade private rights is Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170 (1804). Captain Little of the U.S. Navy seized the Flying Fish and was sued
for damages from his private funds by its owners, who claimed that he had exceeded
the privilege to seize granted by Congress as part of the Quasi-War with France in the
late 1790s. The Court concluded that Congress had authorized seizures of vessels
bound to French ports, but not those coming from French ports like the Flying Fish,
and upheld an award of damages. Id. at 176–79.
In addition to substantive privileges to invade private rights, like those of a
lawful combatant who engages in hostilities within the law of war, officials often enjoy
immunity from litigation for unlawful acts that they reasonably believed to have been
lawful. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 244–45 (2009) (finding that
police officers whose warrantless search was not clearly unlawful when conducted are
entitled to qualified immunity).
284. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 249 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973))
(“Indeed, [in Gilligan] we specifically noted ‘that we neither held nor implied that the
conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not
be accountability in a judicial forum for . . . unlawful conduct by military
personnel . . . .’”).
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The lower court cases that go beyond non-judicial finality and limits on
mandatory remedies thus have no warrant in the Supreme Court’s decisions.
C. Jurisdictional Limits, Substantive Law, and Article III
When the lower courts find that they lack jurisdiction on political
question grounds they depart, not only from the Court’s precedents,
but also from Article III.
The lower court cases that find jurisdictional limits under the
political question rubric rest on a fundamental confusion of the roles
of substantive and jurisdictional law. They have relied on a
jurisdictional limitation to perform functions that can be performed
only by the legal rules that set out the authority of executive officers
and determine whether the conduct of those officers and others is
lawful. One of the functions that only the substantive rules can
perform is the role the lower courts attribute to the political question
doctrine itself: ensuring that the courts respect the lawful authority of
the political branches.
When the lower courts treat the political question doctrine as a limit
on their jurisdiction, as they do in the decisions with which I am
concerned, the doctrine thereby keeps them from applying the
substantive rules that govern the plaintiff’s claim, and in particular the
substantive legal rules that determine whether the defendant’s
conduct was lawful. For example, when the defendant is a member of
the U.S. military and the conduct at issue is related to combat, the
lower courts’ doctrine keeps them from deciding whether the
defendant was entitled to combatant privilege under the law of war.
Combatant privilege permits actions that otherwise would be tortious
or criminal, and is central to the lawfulness of war.285 Without
285.
International law affords combatants a special legal immunity from the
domestic law of the enemy State for their actions done in accordance with the
law of war. This legal immunity is sometimes called the “combatant’s
privilege” or “combatant immunity.” This means that a combatant’s “killing,
wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses,” if they
are done under military authority and are not prohibited by the law of war.
Similarly, a combatant’s warlike acts done under military authority and in
accordance with the law of war also do not create civil liability.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 108 (2015) (hereinafter LAW OF WAR
MANUAL), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf
(footnotes omitted) (quoting E.D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant Gen., Gen. Orders
No. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
FIELD art. 57 (1898)); W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of
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jurisdiction over a claim, a court cannot decide whether that privilege
was available or not.
Combatant privilege is part of a large body of rules that govern
official conduct related to national security and foreign relations.
Related principles apply to the activities of private persons who
participate in government operations, such as military contractors.286
Conceived yet more broadly, foreign relations and national security
law includes all the rules that bear on the foreign affairs and military
operations of the United States. The Sherman Act is part of that law,
especially because its so-called extraterritorial application can have
major consequences for relations between the United States and other
sovereigns.287 Not all the legal rules that regulate or affect foreign
relations and national security are federal law. In a tort action, the
plaintiff’s claim may arise from the law of the place of the tort, which
may be a foreign country, or from the law of the plaintiff’s domicile,
which may be a state of the union.288 But if federal law is applicable it
ultimately controls in any American court. In a tort action growing out
of military operations, the plaintiff’s claim may come from non-federal
law, but the defendant’s combatant privilege may be based on statute
or federal common law.289

Privileged Combatants Under the Geneva Protocol of 1977 Concerning International Conflicts,
42 DUKE J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1978) (stating that individuals who enjoy
combatant privilege have “the legal right, limited by the laws and customs of war, to
exercise coercion and violence in a public armed conflict situation”).
286. The law of war recognizes a distinct category of “persons authorized to
accompany the armed forces,” which includes civilian government employees and
government contractors. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 285, at 142, 144.
287. In F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), the
Supreme Court read the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act consistent with its
practice to construe “ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the
sovereign authority of other nations” because “America’s antitrust laws, when applied
to foreign conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation’s ability independently to
regulate its own commercial affairs.” Id. at 164–65.
288. Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 405 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011)
(noting that the parties agreed that Virginia law applied to Taylor’s negligence claim).
289. The federal source of federal officers’ official privilege was central to the
important case of In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), in which Deputy U.S. Marshal David
Neagle sought discharge through habeas corpus from state custody on a murder
charge. Id. at 3–6. Neagle had been appointed as a bodyguard for Justice Field and
had killed David Terry when, the Court found, Terry assaulted Field. Id. at 52–53. The
Court found that Neagle was eligible for relief through habeas corpus because he had
an “element of power and authority asserted under the government of the United
States.” Id. at 54. For that reason, Neagle was being held in state custody for “an act
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Taken together, those principles perform the primary function of
legal rules: they determine whether conduct is lawful. When courts
apply them, those principles perform two other functions specifically
related to the role of the judiciary in the constitutional system. First,
by applying the substantive law of national security and foreign
relations, courts respect the discretion of the political branches,
including the Executive. By applying statutes that Congress has validly
adopted, courts implement the legislature’s policy decisions. Many
rules confer some kind of authority on executive officials. Combatant
privilege does so, by making lawful all legitimate acts of hostility; within
the bounds set by the law, military decision makers may choose the
strategy and tactics they think best suited to accomplishing the nation’s
goals.
Second, by applying the substantive law relating to foreign relations
and national security, courts avoid interfering with, and to some extent
help implement, the foreign and national security policy of the United
States. For example, the foreign policy of the United States is that
foreign sovereigns may be sued by private parties with respect to their
commercial activities. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act adopts
the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, according to
which sovereigns have immunity for their governmental conduct but
not for their dealings in the marketplace.290 Congress endorsed that
approach to immunity when it adopted the statute, and the federal
courts both respect and implement Congress’s choice when they apply
the relevant substantive law, like the law of contract, to cases in which
foreign governments are properly sued. A court that refused to hear
such a case would disrupt U.S. foreign policy.
Only substantive rules can fully perform those three functions;
jurisdictional limits cannot do so. That is clear with respect to
determining whether conduct is lawful, which substantive rules
accomplish and jurisdictional limits prevent. Perhaps less obvious, but
crucial in assessing the lower courts’ political question cases, is that
only by applying substantive rules can the judiciary properly respect
political discretion and U.S. policy. A court can defer to discretionary

done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States” as required to be eligible
for relief under the habeas corpus statute. Id. at 41.
290. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2004) (noting that
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act adopts the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity).
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choices by the political branches only if it knows the scope of their
discretion, which only substantive rules can tell it.
Two of the lower court cases illustrate this point. In Schneider, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that the political question doctrine deprived it
of jurisdiction, and that the doctrine did so in order to protect
executive discretion and U.S. foreign policy from judicial
interference.291 Because it did not address the merits, however, the
court was not in a position to decide whether there had been a
legitimate exercise of executive discretion and therefore was not in a
position to know what U.S. foreign policy was. If the Constitution and
laws of the United States authorized the National Security Advisor to
encourage the elimination of a foreign political figure, then even if
Secretary Kissinger did what the plaintiffs claimed he did, his acts were
within his discretion and constituted the foreign policy of the United
States. If Secretary Kissinger lacked that authorization, then the court
was neither respecting executive discretionary choices nor giving
appropriate deference to foreign policy; it was allowing lawless acts by
individuals to avoid the liability imposed by the substantive law.
Spectrum Stores is similar. The plaintiffs claimed that actions of
foreign firms, some of them owned by governments, violated U.S.
antitrust statutes. The court of appeals agreed with the executive
branch that the court had no jurisdiction because the policy of the
United States was to manage through negotiations issues concerning
foreign sovereigns’ decisions with respect to their natural resources.292
Those positions contradicted one another, and the contradiction
could be resolved only by deciding the merits and in particular by
deciding whether the Sherman Act applied as the plaintiffs said it did.
If the plaintiffs were right, and the antitrust statutes are constitutional
291. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
292.
By adjudicating this case, the panel would be reexamining critical foreign policy
decisions, including the Executive Branch’s longstanding approach of
managing relations with foreign oil-producing states through diplomacy rather
than private litigation, as discussed in the government’s amicus brief and in
several official statements of administration policy. In accordance with this
policy, the Department of Justice has, upon thorough consideration, declined
to bring a Sherman Act case on behalf of the United States. Any merits ruling
in this case, whether it vindicates or condemns the acts of OPEC member
nations, would reflect a value judgment on their decisions and actions—a
diplomatic determination textually committed to the political branches.
Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 951 (5th Cir. 2011)
(footnote omitted).
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in that respect, then the foreign policy of the United States on this
topic is not limited to negotiation, but includes liability to private
parties. When it acts within its constitutional sphere, Congress sets the
foreign policy of this country, and limits the discretion of the
Executive.293 For all the Fifth Circuit knew in Spectrum Stores, the court’s
decision departed from a foreign policy choice made by the institution
authorized to act for the United States. Only by interpreting the statutes,
which it declined to do, could the court of appeals achieve the goals it set
out to achieve, of ensuring that it implemented U.S. foreign policy.
The court of appeals in Spectrum Stores might have encountered a
constitutional question concerning legislative and executive power
had it decided the merits. It might have found that the antitrust
statutes authorize the kind of lawsuits the executive branch maintained
would be disruptive to U.S. foreign policy. It then would have found
itself with the kind of question the Supreme Court resolved on the
merits in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II).294 In Zivotofsky II, the plaintiff
claimed an entitlement under a statute that, the executive branch
maintained, impermissibly interfered with the President’s
constitutional authority.295 The Court agreed with the executive
branch, and found the statute unconstitutional.296 It did so after
having reversed the court of appeals’s dismissal of the suit on political
question grounds in Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I).297 The political
question doctrine does not keep the courts from deciding whether

293. In Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), plaintiffs
sought an order requiring the Secretary of Commerce to make a statutorily required
certification that Japan’s whaling activities undermined the effectiveness of quotas set
by international convention. Id. at 228. The executive branch had concluded an
executive agreement with Japan concerning Japan’s whaling policy and had
determined that whaling by Japan in compliance with the agreement would not
undermine the quotas. Id. at 227–28. Rejecting the argument that the case presented
a nonjusticiable political question, the Court explained that “interpreting
congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts. It is
also evident that the challenge to the Secretary’s decision not to certify Japan for
harvesting whales in excess of [International Whaling Commission] quotas presents a
purely legal question of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 230. When Congress legislates
within its constitutional authority, the Executive must implement Congress’s choices,
and the courts will enforce that duty in appropriate cases.
294. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
295. Id. at 2083–84.
296. Id. at 2096.
297. 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
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Congress has validly constrained executive discretion with respect to
foreign affairs.298
The phrases that the courts of appeals have carried over from Baker
very likely have confused them on this point, often causing them to
assume their conclusion. They often say that foreign relations or
national security matters are textually committed to the Executive,
which is at best a half truth.299 No text gives U.S. military personnel a
privilege to commit war crimes. Whether the Constitution or any
statute authorizes the National Security Adviser to conspire to arrange
a homicide was a crucial question in Schneider, and the invocation of
general commitment of foreign relations to the President cannot
answer it. Executive officials set and carry out the foreign policy of the
United States only when they act within their lawful authority, which
does not include all the acts they commit under color of law.300
Substantive principles also hold the solution to a problem several
courts of appeals have thought they faced in political question cases.
298.
The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision
of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of
what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be. Instead, Zivotofsky
requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right. To resolve his claim,
the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute is correct,
and whether the statute is constitutional. This is a familiar judicial exercise.
Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 196.
299.
As the Supreme Court suggested in Marbury and made clear in later cases,
“The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—’the political’—Departments
of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”
Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Oetjen v. Cent.
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)). Most constitutional grants of authority to
Congress and the President do not involve the quasi-adjudicatory function that leads
to non-judicial finality under the political question doctrine. See id. at 195. Oetjen is an
exception to that generalization, because it involved recognition of a foreign
government, which is quasi-adjudicatory and does give rise to non-judicial finality. The
statement the D.C. Circuit quoted from Oetjen was correct in its context, but not
applicable in all contexts.
300. Action under color of law can be unlawful. For example, the Supreme Court has
held that the Constitution itself imposes tort liability on federal officials. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Because
it is imposed on federal officials as such, that liability attaches only to conduct under
color of law, and not to conduct in a wholly personal capacity. Because it is tort liability,
it applies to conduct that is not actually legally authorized; if an act is authorized, the
actor enjoys official privilege to engage in it and is not personally liable.
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Drawing on Baker’s reference to judicially manageable standards, a
number of cases have found that the legal rule on which the plaintiff
relied cannot be applied by the federal courts because it requires that
they second-guess foreign policy or national security choices in ways
that would go beyond the judicial role.301 Few if any rules of liability
on which a plaintiff may rely are likely to put such demands on the
courts. Ordinary tort negligence almost certainly does not do so.
Negligent conduct creates an unreasonable risk.302 Courts routinely
decide whether law enforcement officers acted reasonably in making
split-second decisions with life and death in the balance.303 Military
judgments are similar.
If somehow the law on which the plaintiff relies calls on a court to
make a military or foreign policy judgment that federal courts may not
make, principles of official privilege can obviate the problem by
incorporating deference to official judgment. The more deference the
courts give official decision makers, the less the judges are substituting
their own judgment for those of the Executive. The privilege of federal
officials derives from the Constitution, federal statutes, or unwritten
federal law. The Supreme Court has interpreted the latter two sources
of legal rules so as to provide military decision makers with appropriate
301. For example, Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997), was a
damages claim by members of the Turkish Navy for wrongful death and personal injury
arising out of an accident in a training exercise with the U.S. Navy. Id. at 1401–02.
Suit was brought pursuant to statutory waivers of sovereign immunity and the
applicable substantive law was that of wrongful death. Id. at 1402. The Eleventh
Circuit found that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question in part
because “no judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist for resolving the
questions raised by this suit. In order to determine whether the Navy conducted the
missile firing drill in a negligent manner, a court would have to determine how a
reasonable military force would have conducted the drill.” Id. at 1404. As discussed
above, Baker used the lack of judicially manageable standards as an indicator of nonjudicial finality.
302. The law of negligence protects bodily security against “against unintentional
invasion by conduct involving in the thought of reasonable men an unreasonable
hazard that such invasion would ensue.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
99 (N.Y. 1928), reh’g denied 164 N.E. 564 (1928).
303. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court considered
whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his publicendangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from behind. Put another
way: Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious
injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the
lives of innocent bystanders?
Id. at 374.
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protection from undue judicial second-guessing.304 The courts have at
least as much flexibility in shaping unwritten federal law as they do in
interpreting written federal law, and they can derive requirements of
deference from the general principle that official privilege exists in
order to enable officers to perform their function effectively.
Substantive rules have another feature that points up the error of
the lower courts’ jurisdictional doctrine: they apply in state court,
where the limits of Article III do not. If the lower courts are right, the
federal judiciary is barred from deciding highly sensitive issues and
cases that the state courts are free to decide as far as federal law is
concerned. Had the plaintiffs in Schneider sued Secretary Kissinger in
New York state court, no federal rule would have kept the court from
deciding the case, but federal principles of privilege, immunity, and
deference would have protected Kissinger from liability that would
unduly interfere with his federal function. State courts follow their
own rules about jurisdiction, but when they have it, Article VI requires
that they apply federal law that governs the relations of the parties.305
The lower courts’ jurisdictional political question doctrine thus
subverts Article III’s purpose and does not implement it. The
Constitution provides for federal courts so that federal law, federal
interests, and federal officials will have an impartial forum free from
local prejudice.306 Those courts can perform that function only if they

304. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), the Court found that special factors
counseled against inferring a cause of action under the Constitution for service
members against their superior officers. Id. at 298, 305. In Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135 (1950), the Court concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not make
the United States liable for injuries arising out of military service. Id. at 146.
305.
The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law
as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that
the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim
is presented. The general rule, “bottomed deeply in belief in the importance
of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state
courts as it finds them.”
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)).
306. Cases involving foreign relations and national security generally turn on
federal law and affect this country’s foreign relations. Hamilton regarded as axiomatic
“the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its
legislative,” noting that “[t]he mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the
national laws, decides the question.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 412 (Alexander
Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James McClellan, eds., 2001). The importance of a
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have jurisdiction. Article III and the statutes give them jurisdiction in
a wide range of cases involving foreign relations and national security,
and a version of the political question doctrine that denies that
jurisdiction departs from the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has developed it, the political question
doctrine implements limits on the judicial power but not on the cases
Article III courts may decide. The doctrine reflects the quite limited
assignments of final decisional authority to political actors, and the
basic but rarely relevant principle that courts may not exercise political
power through their mandatory remedies. In both respects, it tells
courts how to decide cases, and then leaves them to decide the disputes
that are within their jurisdiction. The doctrine reflects a coherent view
of the nature and limits of the federal judicial power, but to take it as
a limit on the cases federal courts may decide is an easy but serious
error. John Marshall said that no political question could be made in
his court, not that his tribunal could not decide any case involving a
political question.

federal forum for cases affecting U.S. foreign relations “rests on this plain proposition,
that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART.” Id.

